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Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, defendant Sharon's Cultural Educational Recreational 
Association (SCERA) wishes to supplement its brief with 
plaintiff's recently filed complaint in support of defendant/ 
appellee's arguments in Points I through III of its brief that 
plaintiff was an employee of defendant at the time he was 
injured. 
We appreciate your assistance. 
Very truly yours, 
HANSON, EJEPERSON & SMITH 
H. Epperson 
Jaryl L. Rencher 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT GOURDIN, a minor, by and 
through h i s guard ian ad l i t e m , 
Wayne C. C l o s e , 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs. 
SHARON'S CULTURAL EDUCATIONAL 
RECREATION ASSOCIATION (SCERA), 
SUMMONS 
a C i v i l NO. C7/OYOOVO^>P/ 
Defendant. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer in 
writing to the attached complaint with the Clerk of the 
above-entitled court at 125 North 100 West, Provo UT 84601, and to 
serve upon, or mail to Brent D. Young, at 48 North University 
Avenue, Provo UT 84601, plaintiff's attorney, a copy of said answer, 
within 20 days after service of this summons upon you. 
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken against 
you for the relief demanded in said complaint, which has been filed 
with the Clerk of said court and a copy of which is attached hereto 
and herewith served upon you. 
Dated: June 2#> , 1991. 
—•» T -^ «^ ,«, 
^ c^ r v e r 
BRENT D. YO^NG/ 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
48 North university Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT GOURDIN, a minor, by and 
through his guardian ad litem, 
Wayne C. Close, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHARON'S CULTURAL EDUCATIONAL 
RECREATION ASSOCIATION (SCERA), 
COMPLAINT 
c i v i l NO. qfnVnOLfO'S£>\ 
Defendant. 
1. Plaintiff brings this action to preserve his rights should 
the Utah Supreme Court rule in the appeal pending before it that the 
injured minor, Scott Gourdin, was a statutory employee of defendant 
on June 21, 1985, whose exclusive remedy is under the Workers1s 
Compensation Act. 
2. This action does not constitute a waiver of presently 
pending claims and is wholly dependent upon the ruling of the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
3. On June 21, 1985, Scott Gourdin, a seven year old minor 
child, was mowing the lawn at defendant's theatre located at 745 
South State Street, Orem, Utah. 
4. Scott Gourdin was injured while mowing defendant's lawn. 
5. Defendant did not provide worker's compensation coverage 
for Scott Gourdin or, in the alternative, did not file the claim as 
required. 
6. Dependent upon the ruling of the Utah Supreme Court in the 
pending appeal, plaintiff is entitled to recover for his injuries 
pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §35-1-57, in an amount to be proved at 
trial. 
7. Scott Gourdin has received medical treatment at substantial 
cost. 
8. Plaintiff must bring this action at this time to toll the 
statute of limitations for this injury. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for the following relief from 
defendant: 
1) Special damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2) General damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
3) Costs of court incurred herein. 
4) Such other,and further relief as the court deems just in 
the premises. 
Dated: June 2 o , 1991. 
BRENT D. YOUNG) 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Wayne Wardle, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
F I L E D 
rJUN 151990 
' i>wr*. c* fet Court 
c 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 890372-CA 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Attorneys: Gary Pendleton, St. George, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Bullock.1 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Wayne Wardle appeals his jury convictions of aggravated 
arson, a first-degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-103 (1990), and insurance fraud, a second-degree felony 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521 (1990). We affirm. 
Wardle raises five issues on appeal: (1) insufficiency 
of the evidence; (2) denial of due process; (3) improper expert 
testimony; (4) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (5) 
refusal of jury instruction. 
Wardle owned and operated A-l Maintenance in an old home 
in Murray, Utah. He was at the business for one-half hour the 
morning of October 20, 1986. About thirty minutes after he 
departed, the Murray City fire department was dispatched to the 
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) 
(Supp. 1989). 
business. The firefighters arrived four minutes later and 
found the building ablaze. 
Investigators agreed that the point of origin of the fire 
was adjacent to Wardle's desk in his office area. They 
discovered a soldering iron next to his desk that had been 
burning for several days and had penetrated the carpet/ pad and 
one-half inch into the underlying particle board. The burn 
pattern around the iron was consistent with the use of an 
accelerant, such as flammable liquid. Tests revealed the 
presence of a light range hydrocarbon/ an accelerant/ in the 
carpet. Investigators concluded that the fire was 
intentionally set. They concluded that the iron would not 
ignite flames without the aid of an accelerant or manipulation 
of a garbage bag to create a bellows effect. All investigators 
agreed that# on that morning, Wardle could not have avoided 
seeing or smelling the burning produced by the iron. 
Wardle's building was insured for $30/000. His one-year 
policy became effective three months prior to the fire. The 
insurance claims investigator described the building as a 
NshackM that could have been replaced for about $13#000. After 
the fire, Wardle says he was not too concerned about the 
building because he was planning to demolish it anyway, which 
he did for $450. He said he had received bids for demolition 
at $l,700-$l/800 and had a loan for a new building. He also 
stated that the fire did not affect his ability to continue in 
business because it was his off-season and there was little 
equipment or furnishings in the building. 
Wardle retained a public adjustor to prepare an insurance 
claim and filed his claim for $24/984.75. Wardle signed the 
proof of loss statement. The claim was settled for $15,900. 
We will examine the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the guilty verdicts on both charges. When reviewing a 
claim that the evidence was insufficient/ we must view the 
evidence and all inferences that may be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116/ 117 (Utah 1989). If there is evidence from which the jury 
could have found all the elements of the crime# our inquiry 
must stop and the conviction must be affirmed. State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342/ 345 (Utah 1985). 
First/ we will examine the evidence supporting the 
verdict of aggravated arson. Section 76-6-103(1) provides in 
relevant part: 
a person is guilty of aggravated arson if 
by means of fire or explosives he 
intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure!!.] 
Three arson investigators examined the cause of the fire: Dean 
Larsen, Murray City fire marshall and assistant chief; John 
Blundell, at Larsen's request; and James Ashley, at the request 
of Wardle's insurer. Each testified that the fire was 
intentionally set. Further, the State chemist's discovery of 
hydrocarbon/ a fire accelerant/ in carpet samples was 
consistent with the investigators* determinations that the 
carpet burn patterns revealed the use of an accelerant. Wardle 
was on the premises shortly before the fire was discovered/ and 
he was there at his desk when the smoldering soldering iron 
could not have been overlooked. The door was locked and Wardle 
had the keys. Wardle1s only explanation for the fire was that 
he must have kicked or moved a paper sack full of garbage onto 
the smoldering iron that morning without noticing what he had 
done. The jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence 
before it that Wardle had intentionally started the fire. We 
find sufficient evidence in the record to support Wardle's 
conviction of aggravated arson. 
Next/ we will examine the evidence supporting the verdict 
of insurance fraud. Section 76-6-521 provides: 
Every person who presents, or causes 
to be presented, any false or fraudulent 
claim# or any proof in support of any such 
claim, upon any contract of insurance for 
the payment of any loss, or who prepares/ 
makes or subscribes any account/ 
certificate of survey, affidavit or proof 
of loss, or other book/ paper or writing, 
with intent to present or use the same/ or 
to allow it to be presented or used/ in 
support of any such claim is punishable as 
in the manner prescribed for theft of 
property of like value. 
Wardle submitted to Ohio Casualty Insurance Company a 
"Sworn Statement In Proof of Loss." The statement contains the 
following affirmation: "The said loss did not originate by any 
act/ design or procurement on the part of the insured or this 
affiant." The document was duly subscribed and sworn to by 
Wardle. The jury, having found Wardle guilty of aggravated 
arson, could only conclude that the above affirmation was 
false. This evidence alone is sufficient to support Wardle's 
conviction of insurance fraud. Thus, we do not need to 
consider the State's claim that evidence of the inflated values 
listed in the proof of loss statement was sufficient to support 
the insurance fraud conviction. 
Wardle framed his due process argument as follows: 
"Defendant was denied due process as a result of unwarranted 
and prejudicial attacks upon his character and credibility." 
His first complaint is that the State inappropriately used the 
insurance fraud count as a "vehicle for prejudicing the 
defendant." Wardle fails to cite a single authority in support 
of this point or to demonstrate that it constitutes a denial of 
due process. Wardle's second due process complaint alleges 
unfair prejudice from "unwarranted attacks related to his 
financial circumstances." Again, Wardle has not cited any 
authorities which mention due process. The only Utah case 
cited is State v. Peterson. 722 P.2d 768 (Utah 1986), which is 
not on point. That case involved impeachment of a defendant 
based on prior criminal convictions. Here, Wardle was not 
asked about any prior criminal activity or convictions. He was 
asked about some civil judgments bearing on his financial 
condition prior to the fire, and he admitted having had five or 
six civil judgments against him. Wardle has failed to properly 
articulate his due process claim or cite supporting authority 
for this argument. We think that it was proper to inquire 
about Wardle's financial status as revealing a motive for arson 
and insurance fraud. See People v. Folsom, 220 Cal. App. 2d 
809, 34 Cal. Rptr. 148, 150 (1963). 
We turn next to Wardle's claim that his conviction was 
based on "improper 'expert' testimony." He complains about the 
following testimony: (1) Larsen was asked, "What is your 
theory of the case, how did this fire start?" He replied, "My 
opinion is that the soldering iron was put there prior to the 
actual fire itself; that it smoldered for quite some time 
without getting in complete combustion or the fire stage; that 
it was discovered by Mr. Wardle and that he accelerated it, put 
some type of flammable liquid on it to get it started and then 
left." (2) Ashby was asked whether he was "able to form some 
kind of theory as to what happened here?" He stated that the 
soldering iron was placed on the floor with a bag of garbage on 
Thursday, that Wardle went back to investigate, found the bag 
slow burning and used something to create an open flame and 
left. He believed the smoldering iron "would have been very 
noticeable, the smoke, the odor, something, something should 
have told Mr. Wardle that things were amiss." (3) Blundell 
summarized, "[B]asically what we're saying is that the 
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defendant lied about what he found when he walked into the 
building that morning because smoke would have been present." 
Wardle directs us to Utah Rules of Evidence 704 and 403 as 
the basis for his argument that admission of the above 
testimony was "manifest error/ Those rules provide: 
Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue. 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an 
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence 
on ground of prejudice, confusion, or 
waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by 
consideration of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Wardle argues that this testimony from the experts should 
have been excluded because its probative value was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. His argument 
simply regurgitates the language of the rule. Then he cites 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), as requiring 
reversal of his convictions "based upon the erroneous and 
prejudical admission of expert testimony."2 
Wardle undertook no analysis of Rimmasch as it relates to 
his case, but simply shared a quote from page 399: 
We remain wary of the potential of such 
evidence to distort the fact-finding 
process by reason of its superficial 
plausibility and its potential for 
inducing fact finders to accept expert 
judgment on critical issues rather than 
making their own. 
2. Besides Rimmasch, Wardle cites only State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 
89, 60 P.2d 952, 958 (1936), in support of his claim of 
"manifest error" based on improper expert testimony. 
We note that Rinunasch treats Rules 608(a) and 702, which Wardle 
has not mentioned. Wardle argues further that the following 
rhetorical question by the prosecutor during closing argument 
suggested to the jury "that it may forego independent analysis 
of the factsH and decide the case on a single issue: 
Do you believe these three arson 
investigators when they reached the 
conclusion that this was an intentionally 
set fire, or do you believe the defendant 
when he says it was an accident? 
To us, this question sets the issue correctly as one of 
credibility. The parties each had a theory concerning the 
cause of the fire, i.e., intentional or accidental. The jury 
believed the experts and not Wardle. Credibility of witnesses 
is a matter for the jury to determine. State v. Baalev, 681 
P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984). 
Next, Wardle contends his trial counsel was ineffective, 
resulting in a denial of his sixth amendment rights. In 
evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we must 
determine that counsel's performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment and that defendant 
was prejudiced. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989). 
First, Wardle contends that counsel should have objected to 
the prosecutor's insurance fraud theory and argument that 
Wardle1s proof of loss statement was inflated because that 
theory was unsupported by the evidence. However, Wardle 
ignores testimony that his building was valued at $13,000 and 
that he accepted $15,900 after submitting a claim for $25r000. 
Further, Wardle testified that he would have been happy to 
receive $5,000-$6,000 because he was not sure he had insurance 
and that was what he felt his loss was at the time. His proof 
of loss statement listed $544 for sheetrock when there was no 
sheetrock in the walls that burned. From this evidence, the 
prosecutor could properly argue that Wardle believed the value 
of his building to be about $6,000 and that his $25,000 claim 
was inflated and padded. Thus, an objection to the 
prosecutor's argument would not have been well taken. We find 
no deficiency in counsel's performance in this regard. 
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Next/ Wardle contends that counsel "was remiss in allowing 
the State to introduce, without objection, improper opinion 
evidence which was clearly prejudicial to defendant.H 
Prejudice is established where this Court's confidence in the 
verdict is undermined because there is a reasonable likelihood 
of a different result if counsel had not performed 
deficiently. State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). Assuming arguendo that counsel was deficient in 
not objecting to the experts1 insertion of Wardle's name in 
their hypotheses as to how the fire started, we find no 
prejudice. Wardle was the last known person in the building 
prior to the fire. He was there shortly before the fire. An 
accelerant was applied to the fire. Wardle's failure to see or 
smell the smoldering iron next to his desk where the fire 
originated is inexplicable. We find it highly improbable that 
the jury found Wardle guilty because his name was mentioned by 
the experts. Wardle*s HaccidentM explanation placed his 
credibility squarely at odds with that of the experts, even 
without Blundell's commentary on the divergent testimony. 
Because Wardle has not demonstrated prejudice, his conviction 
must stand. See State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
We have carefully considered Wardle's remaining claim 
regarding the trial court's failure to give a jury 
instruction,3 and we conclude it is meritless. 
Affirmed. 
Norman H. Jackson,^uudge 
WE GONCUR: 
3. The brief contains a single page of argument and cites a 
single case as follows: "See State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 
(Utah 1982) (citing numerous cases)." 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
WAYNE S. WARDLE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890372-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of two second 
degree felonies in the district court. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was defendant denied due process by the nature of 
the charges filed or by cross examination about his financial 
condition? 
2. Did defendant waive his claim that the expert's 
opinions were improper by failing to object? 
3. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury 
verdicts? 
4. Was it error for the trial court to refuse to 
instruct the jury concerning a reasonable alternative hypothesis? 
5. Was counsel ineffective by failing to object to the 
expert opinions? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of all relevant authorities is quoted in the 
body of this brief, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with aggravated arson, a 
first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (Supp. 
1989); and insurance fraud, a second degree felony, under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-521 (1978). Defendant was tried by a jury in 
the Third District Court on February 21-23, 1989, the Honorable 
Frank G. Noel, presiding. The jury found defendant guilty of 
both counts. Judge Noel entered judgment for the next lower 
category of second degree felony aggravated arson and sentenced 
defendant to a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State 
prison. Judge Noel also sentenced defendant to a term of one to 
fifteen years for insurance fraud. Both sentences run 
concurrently. Judge Noel stayed the prison sentences and placed 
defendant on 18 months probation on the condition that he serve 6 
months in jail, pay a fine of $4000 and pay restitution of 
$15,900. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 20, 1986 a fire damaged defendant's business 
building at 397 W. 5900 S., Murray, Utah (T. 22, 72, 309). The 
business, A-1 Maintenance, was located in an old home that was in 
very poor condition (T. 34, 76, 209, 310)- Defendant was at the 
business that morning from about 6:45 to 7:15 (T, 74, 309). He 
said that he neither smelled nor saw anything (T. 182, 272, 310, 
338)-
At 7:44 a.m. the Murray City Fire Department was 
dispatched to the business (T. 22). When the fire fighters 
arrived at 7:48/ there were large flames coming out of the front 
of the building and going above the roofline (T. 22, 23). They 
were able to see the smoke from the station which is 7 blocks 
away (T. 22, 24). 
Investigators determined that the point of origin of 
the fire was located next to a desk in the office area of the 
building (T. 47, 160, 211). At that location they found a 
soldering iron that had been burning into the carpet for several 
days (T. 52, 165-66, 175, 211, 222-24). Below the soldering iron 
the carpet and pad had been completely burned away; and there was 
about a half-inch deep hole in the particle board flooring (T. 
52, 165-66, 222). Surrounding the iron was a burn pattern 
consistent with the use of an accelerant, such as a flammable 
liquid (T. 53, 170-71, 210, 268-69, 283-84). Tests revealed the 
presence of a light range hydrocarbon, an accelerant, in samples 
of the carpet (T. 130). That the fire spread with more intensity 
than usual also indicated the use of a flammable liquid (T. 57, 
122, 282-82). The burn patterns did not establish a widespread 
use of a flammable liquid; but they were consistent with its use 
at the point of origin (T. 229, 268-69, 283-84). 
The investigators concluded that the fire was 
intentionally set (T. 64, 173, 228). They based this conclusion 
on the fact that there would have been a great deal of smoke from 
the soldering iron burning into the carpet and flooring (T. 182, 
193, 200, 227). Also, they concluded that the soldering iron 
could not generate enough heat to ignite into flames without the 
aid of some accelerant or perhaps manipulation of a garbage bag 
that had been placed on top of the iron in such a way that it 
created a bellows effect and caused embers in the area to ignite 
(T. 67, 176, 181, 219, 225, 226). 
The experts disagreed whether the soldering iron would 
more likely land on its handle or its heated tip if knocked from 
the desk. James Ashby opined that if the soldering iron had been 
knocked off of the desk accidentally, it probably would have 
landed on the hot tip, smoldered and immediately produced 
noticeable smoke, but no flames (T. 217, 219). Dean Larsen and 
John Blundell believed the iron would more likely have landed on 
its handle, and would require a weight to hold the tip down (T. 
64-66, 122, 166). All three agreed that if the iron was on the 
floor while defendant was inside the building, as it must have 
been to have burned into the subfloor, defendant could not avoid 
seeing smoke or smelling it (T. 59, 177, 182, 193, 200, 226-27). 
Defendant's building was insured for $30,000 (T. 142). 
The one-year policy became effective three months before the 
fire, on July 22, 1986 (T. 153). The insurance claims 
investigator said the building was not worth $30,000 because it 
was, as he described it, "a shack" (T. 148). All of the exterior 
siding had been removed (T. 153). He would not have written a 
policy on the building because there was no incentive for the 
owner to protect it (T. 148). He believed it could have been 
replaced for about $13,000 (T. 149). 
After the fire, defendant said he was not too concerned 
about the loss of the building because he was planning to 
demolish it anyway (T. 147). Defendant said he had received bids 
for the demolition and that he had obtained a small business loan 
to build a new building (T. 147, 331). He also stated that it 
was his off season; and the fire did not affect his ability to 
continue his business (T. 73, 147). There was not much equipment 
nor furnishings inside the building (T. 229). 
Defendant also told Dean Larsen that he was in the 
process of changing his company name from A-l Maintenance to A-l 
Sprinkler because of some possible litigation (T. 76). He also 
said he was not sure he had insurance, but thought he had $6000 
coverage (T. 76). Defendant admitted at trial there were civil 
judgments outstanding against him in 1986 and admitted he had 
been sued by former employees (T. 342, 343, 351, 354-55). He 
admitted he was in the process of changing the business name at 
the time of the fire, but denied at trial that it was because of 
lawsuits (T. 343)• He also admitted to changing banks, but also 
denied that it was because of lawsuits (T. 344-45, 351). 
On December 5, 1985, defendant approached the Murray 
City Planning Commission with plans for a new building. He 
completed a building permit form on April 22, 1986. A month 
before the fire, in September 1986, defendant inquired about 
obtaining a demolition permit from Murray City (T. 291-2, 321). 
At the time of the fire, he had already obtained a small business 
loan and was waiting for an advantageous time to go ahead with 
his plans to demolish the existing building and construct a new 
one (T. 327). He had obtained bids for the demolition that were 
around $1700-1800 (T. 331). After the fire, he demolished the 
building himself for $450 (T. 353). 
Defendant retained a public adjustor to file a claim 
with the insurance company (T. 144, 150, 325). A public adjustor 
stands in the shoes of the insured, estimates the amount of loss 
suffered, and is paid for this service through an assignment of a 
percentage of the claim (T. 150-51). The claim defendant filed 
through the public adjustor was for $24,984.75 (T. 144). The 
public adjustor made the estimates and defendant signed the Proof 
of Loss Statement (T. 143-44, 326, 333). Eventually, the 
insurance company settled with defendant and the public adjustor 
for $15,900 (T. 144, 152). Defendant testified that he would 
have settled, however, for $5000-6000 because he was not sure he 
was insured and he thought he could have replaced everything he 
was going to take out of the old building and use in his new 
building for that amount (T. 334). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The record does not support defendant's claims that the 
prosecutor acted in bad faith in arguing that defendant's 
insurance claim was inflated or in questioning defendant about 
his financial status. There was evidence from which the jury 
could find that defendant's claim exceeded the value of the lost 
property, and defendant admitted there were judgments against him 
around the time of the fire. 
Defendant failed to object to the expert testimony and 
has waived his claim of error. Moreover, admission of the 
testimony was not plain error where there were no other suspects 
and all of the evidence pointed toward a conclusion that 
defendant lied about what happened. That the experts named 
defendant as the culprit was harmless. 
The evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant 
committed aggravated arson. The nature of the fire and its 
origin, along with the presence of hydrocarbons, established that 
the fire was not accidental. There was circumstantial evidence 
that defendant set the fire. There was evidence that defendant 
committed insurance fraud either by filing an excessive claim or 
merely by filing a claim after intentionally burning the 
building. The claim he filed would not have been paid if the 
insurance company knew the fire was set by defendant. Also, the 
property was worth only $13,000; yet, defendant signed a claim 
for nearly $25,000. 
The trial court was not required to give a reasonable 
alternative hypothesis instruction where the jury was instructed 
that the State had the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Defendant did not object to the reasonable doubt 
instructions that were given. In fact, they were identical to 
his proposed instructions. Thus, he cannot claim any error. 
Trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to object 
to the expert testimony. The testimony was harmless in light of 
the fact that there were no other suspects. There is no 
reasonable likelihood of a different result even if counsel had 
objected to the experts naming defendant as the culprit in their 
theories about how the fire was set. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE 
MANNER OF CHARGING THE OFFENSES NOR BY THE 
CROSS EXAMINATION ABOUT HIS FINANCIAL 
CONDITION. 
Defendant asserts that he was denied due process 
because the prosecutor used the insurance fraud charge to attack 
his character, and because the prosecutor questioned him 
concerning his financial condition without presenting extrinsic 
evidence. Defendant's claims of unfair prejudice rest upon his 
misleading representation of the facts presented at trial and his 
mischaracterization of the cross examination about his finances 
as impeachment. The claims are meritless. 
First, defendant asserts that the only evidence that he 
inflated his insurance claim was that he hired a public adjustor 
who prepared his claim, that he signed the claim, and that the 
prosecutor implied that he listed too many soldering irons on the 
Proof of Loss statement. Defendant ignores that the insurance 
claims investigator testified that defendant's building was a 
shack that was not worth more than $13,000. Yet, defendant's 
claim was for $24,984.75, and he actually received $15,900. 
Interestingly, defendant acknowledges this evidence in a footnote 
to an excerpt of the prosecutor's argument where he says only: 
-The prosecutor's comments apparently refer to that portion of 
Mic Jensen's testimony appearing at T. 148-149." App. Br. at 12 
n.4. 
In the appendix of his brief, defendant supplies a 
copy of a Proof of Loss Statement that he purports is the one 
introduced at trial. The actual exhibit is not included in +-*<=> 
Further, defendant testified that he would have been 
happy to receive $5,000-6,000 because he was not sure he had 
insurance and it was what he really felt he had lost at the time 
(T. 334), Defendant planned to demolish the building prior to 
the fire and had received a bid of $1800 which he would have had 
to pay for the demolition (T. 331). Defendant had removed the 
siding from the building in preparation for demolition (T. 153, 
310). The structure was not completely destroyed by the fire. 
Other than the room defendant used as an office, the other rooms 
sustained mainly smoke damage (T. 85-8). 
The Proof of Loss statement provided in the appendix of 
defendant's brief lists an estimate of $544 for sheetrock for the 
office wall, yet, prior to the fire, there was no sheetrock on 
the walls in the area of the office that burned (T. 37, 87-88, 
104). There was only thin wood paneling with no sheetrock 
underneath (T. 37). 
From the evidence, the jury could infer that defendant 
really believed the building to be of little or no value. The 
amount of the insurance claim in comparison to the value of the 
property, as well as the fact that much of the structure remained 
intact, establish inflation of the claim. 
Defendant asserts that a prosecution based solely on 
the theory that his claim was inflated "would have been nothing 
less than malicious." App. Br. at 12. Given the evidence that 
his total claim for a partially destroyed structure exceeded the 
total value of the building, defendant's assertion is erroneous. 
There is no basis for his claim that the prosecutor argued this 
theory simply to discredit and badger him. 
To support his claim that the prosecutor acted in bad 
faith in questioning him about soldering irons, defendant 
includes in his brief a copy of a Proof of Loss Statement. The 
actual exhibit is not part of the record on appeal. This Court 
should disregard his claim of bad faith which is based upon 
matters not included in the record. State v. Cooky 714 P.2d 296, 
297 (Utah 1986). It is defendant's duty to establish from the 
record support for his claims of error. State v. Robbins, 709 
P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985). Furthermore, defendant did not object 
to the line of questioning at trial. He cannot claim for the 
first time on appeal that the trial court erred in allowing the 
prosecutor to make the inquiry where he did not object. State v. 
Barella, 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986). 
Assuming arguendo that defendant has provided record 
support for his claim, the cross examination of defendant 
regarding the number of soldering irons that were in his business 
on the date of the fire does not establish bad faith on the part 
of the prosecutor. In his earlier testimony, defendant denied 
knowing what was contained in the Proof of Loss Statement he 
signed (T. 326). He insisted that he simply relied on someone 
else to prepare the statement, and that he felt they were 
accurate, so he signed it (T. 340-42). The prosecutor was 
entitled to establish whether defendant had any idea of the 
contents of the statement he signed. Defendant said he did not 
know how many soldering irons were listed on the claim. When 
there were no soldering irons listed on the claim, the prosecutor 
could have expected a person who had read what they signed to 
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answer, "none." Moreover, it was defendant who opened up this 
area by volunteering that he had at least half a dozen soldering 
irons other than the two that he was being questioned about at 
the time (T. 339). The prosecutor was entitled to question 
defendant's credibility concerning the accuracy of the Proof of 
Loss Statement. This is especially true where defendant claimed 
not to have any idea of what was contained in the Proof of Loss 
Statement. 
Furthermore, attempting to pin down how much equipment 
defendant had was relevant to whether defendant had planned the 
fire and had possibly removed his equipment prior to the fire so 
it would not be burned. Where defendant had stated to 
investigators that his business would not be affected much by the 
loss of his building, and where the investigators said there was 
not much equipment inside the building (T. 229), the prosecutor 
was entitled to explore, and the jury was entitled to infer, why 
that might be so. Defendant's inability, or unwillingness, to 
say how many soldering irons he owned or had claimed, or to say 
where they were located, taken together with the fact that he 
claimed none on the Proof of Loss Statement, could lead the jury 
to infer that defendant had planned the fire and removed his 
equipment from the building. 
Defendant also contends that the prosecutor acted in 
bad faith by asking him about his financial status without also 
offering extrinsic proof. He concedes that the prosecutor had 
some latitude to establish a financial motive in an insurance 
fraud/arson case; however, he asserts that the prosecutor could 
not attempt to establish that motive only through cross 
examination. The circumstances of this case do not support his 
theory that the prosecutor acted in bad faith by asking the 
questions. 
Defendant admitted having had at least five or six 
judgments against him (T. 354). He admitted that Western General 
Dairies had a judgment against him (T. 342). He admitted he 
believed he had "a couple" of outstanding judgments in 1986 (T. 
354). He claimed, however, that he could not recall if he had 
any judgments in effect or pending at the time of the fire,, He 
denied knowing a man by the name of Gary Gavin, but admitted that 
employees had sued him during the time of the fire (T. 343). In 
fact, defense counsel continued the line of questioning with: 
Q. Mr. Jones asked you about a judgment. 
Had the judgments they had against you 
been satisfied? 
A. I have no judgments against me at this 
time. 
Q. At one time you had a judgment against 
you; is that right? 
A. I'm sure I did. 
Q. Had that been satisfied prior to this 
fire? 
A. I don't recall. I don't know which 
judgments we're talking about. 
(T. 351). Defendant conveniently ignores that his own attorney 
believed that the prosecutor had a good faith basis for the 
inquiry and also ignores that he admitted judgments existed. 
Apparently, defense counsel knew the judgments existed. He also 
ignores that his use of the word "which" in his last response 
implies that judgments existed. 
In fact, defendant's responses support a finding of 
good faith on the part of the prosecutor. Defendant admitted 
that there were judgments against him. Even his own attorney 
attempted to bring out this evidence. Evidently, the purpose of 
the prosecutor's questions about his financial status was to 
establish a motive for arson and for filing a false or inflated 
insurance claim (see T. 342; "Goes to financial interest, your 
honor."). The evidence was not sought for impeachment of 
defendant's credibility. The prosecutor did not make such an 
argument in closing. Defense counsel asked the jury to disregard 
the evidence completely (T. 391). On rebuttal, the prosecutor 
merely responded with: 
Maybe there's nothing financial about the 
reason he set the place on fire. I don't 
know, but that's not really an issue you need 
to be concerned about. 
(T. 404). Thus, the prosecutor did not stress the issue. Any 
improper inferences that could have been drawn were minimized. 
In a very similar case, the California District Court 
of Appeals held that it is proper in an arson/fraudulent 
insurance claim case for the prosecutor to attempt to establish a 
motive through questions about the defendant's financial status. 
People v. Folsom, 34 Cal. Rptr. 148, 150 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1963). The court went on to note that the defendant's responses 
generally supported a finding of good faith on the part of the 
prosecutor. Icl. Defendant acknowledges this case in his brief 
but continues to characterize the inquiry as impeachment without 
acknowledging the prosecutor's stated purpose for the inquiry. 
The cases cited by defendant in support of his claim 
that he was unfairly prejudiced are inapplicable in this 
situation. This is not a case like State v. Peterson, 722 P.2d 
768 (Utah 1986), where the defendant denied having a previous 
criminal conviction that the prosecutor questioned him about for 
credibility reasons. Defendant was questioned here about civil 
judgments, not criminal convictions, and defendant admitted 
having suffered civil judgments. The facts of this case do not 
approach the prejudice suffered when it is implied that a 
criminal defendant has previous criminal convictions that he is 
trying to hide from the jury. Three other cases cited by 
defendant are all cases in which the prosecutor, for impeachment 
purposes, inquired about previous criminal convictions. See, 
e.g., Kizer v. State, 93 P.2d 58, 88 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1939); 
Tomarchio v. State, 665 P.2d 804, 808 (Nev. 1963); State v. 
Kramp, 651 P.2d 614, 618 (Mont. 1982). They are also 
inapplicable. 
Davis v. State, 413 P.2d 920 (Okla. Cr. 1966), also 
lends little support to defendant's claim. The financial inquiry 
in that case was error because the prosecutor implied without 
proof that the money deposited into the defendant's bank account 
was illegally obtained. The crime charged was grand larceny. 
The prosecutor was not impeaching the defendant nor establishing 
a motive for crime. He was insinuating, without an evidentiary 
basis, that the source of the funds was criminal. Much of the 
material quoted by defendant refers to the second issue in Davis. 
That issue was that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he 
asked defendant's boss, the police chief, if a major burglary had 
occurred after defendant began working for him. The prosecutor 
attempted to use this inquiry to impeach the chief's direct 
character testimony that defendant did a good job as a police 
officer. The court noted that there was no proof defendant 
committed the burglary—that it was pure conjecture. 
This case is distinguishable from Davis. There was no 
implication that defendant obtained money from an illegal source. 
The inquiry about his finances was intended to establish a motive 
for the crimes charged, not to impeach his character or establish 
other crimes. Also, defendant admitted the judgments existed. 
He did not repeatedly deny their existence as he claims. 
Further, the prosecutor did not act in bad faith when 
he asked defendant about his reasons for moving his bank accounts 
and changing the name of his business. This area is one in which 
there is seldom extrinsic proof. Defendant's reasons for his 
actions are matters generally obtainable only by inference unless 
the defendant himself is willing to state those reasons. It was 
proper for the prosecutor to bring out that defendant had moved 
his accounts and that he had changed the name of his business. 
The prosecutor was not required to establish anything with regard 
to defendant's reasons for these actions, but could have left the 
matter entirely open for any inference the jury chose to draw 
from the evidence given all of the circumstances of the case. 
Defendant attempts to create unfair prejudice where there is 
none. His convictions should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY AND WAIVED HIS CLAIM THAT IT WAS 
IMPROPER. 
Defendant claims that the State's experts improperly 
stated their theories that defendant must have been lying to them 
about what happened the morning of the fire and improperly 
referred to him as the person who set the fire. He requests this 
Court to reverse his convictions based upon this claim even 
though trial counsel did not object to the expert opinions. He 
asserts it was plain error to allow the testimony. 
By failing to object to the expert testimony, defendant 
waived any claim of error. State v. Eldredgef 773 P.2d 29, 34 
(Utah 1989) (must clearly and definitely object to admission of 
evidence to preserve issue for appeal); see also Utah R. Evid. 
103(a). Thus, defendant may prevail only if admission of the 
evidence was plain error. Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35. 
In order for an error to be plain, it must have been 
obvious to the trial court that it was committing error by 
admitting the evidence, and admission of the evidence must have 
been harmful. Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35. The error in this case 
was neither obvious nor harmful. 
The investigators had already testified that defendant 
told them he was inside the building within a half hour before 
the fire fighters were dispatched. When fire fighters arrived at 
the building, there was a large volume of flames coming from the 
building. From the investigators' experiments and their 
experience with fires, they determined that the size of the fire 
at 7:44 a.m. indicated there must have been noticeable smoke in 
the building when defendant was there. Further, defendant said 
that he was working at the desk right next to the point of origin 
of the fire (T. 310-11). He claimed he kicked a bag of trash out 
of his way into the general area where the soldering iron was 
found and left shortly afterward (T. 311, 313-14). There was no 
evidence presented that anyone else had entered the building 
after defendant left. The door was locked, and when defendant 
arrived at the fire, he tried to unlock it for the fire fighters 
(T. 316). There was evidence that a light range hydrocarbon was 
used to accelerate the fire. 
Defendant alleges that it was improper for the experts 
to give their opinions that defendant was not telling the truth 
when he said he neither saw nor smelled smoke that morning. 
This, however, was entirely proper. Because defendant made 
statements about the lack of smoke, the State was entitled to ask 
whether it was possible for defendant to have been inside the 
building and not have noticed smoke from the type of fire that 
the experts had described. The jury would have no experience 
from which it could draw such a conclusion. 
From the experts' explanation that this fire would have 
been smoldering and producing a large quantity of smoke when 
defendant said he was inside the building, the jury was entitled 
to infer that defendant knew the fire was burning when he left 
the building. Where there were no other suspects and where 
defendant claimed that the fire must have started accidentally 
after he left, it was harmless for the experts to state that they 
believed defendant was lying. 
While the experts should not have named defendant as 
the culprit in their theories about wha-: the culprit might have 
done to accelerate the fire, see State v, Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 
(Utah 1989), their testimony would have left little doubt in any 
event that they thought defendant was lying and that defendant 
must have been responsible for the fire. There were no other 
suggested suspects, and defendant admitted being in the building 
that morning. For these reasons, even if it was obvious to a 
judge that the experts were committing an error, there was no 
resulting prejudice to support a finding of plain error. 
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
JURY VERDICTS. 
When reviewing a claim that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the jury's verdict, this Court must view 
the evidence and all inferences that may be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 117 (Utah 1989). If there is evidence from which the jury 
could have found all of the elements of the crime, this Court's 
inquiry must stop, and the conviction must be affirmed. State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). The presence of 
contradictory evidence does not establish that the evidence was 
insufficient. State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 781-2 (Utah 1986). 
Defendant first claims that there is insufficient 
evidence of aggravated arson. He fails in his claim to marshal 
the facts in support of the jury verdict even though he may not 
prevail in an insufficiency claim unless he marshals the facts 
supporting the verdict and then establishes some deficiency. In 
re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (Supp. 1989) defines 
aggravated arson as intentionally and unlawfully damaging a 
habitable structure by means of fire or explosives. The evidence 
outlined in the Statement of Facts above was sufficient to 
support the jury's verdict. Defendant overlooks most of this 
evidence in his contention that the evidence was insufficient. 
Defendant states that the experts disagreed about 
whether the soldering iron tip would remain in contact with the 
floor if dropped accidentally. This is true. However, he fails 
to note that all of the experts agreed that, regardless of 
whether the tip had accidentally or purposefully remained in 
contact with the floor for as long as 4 or 5 days, it would not 
have ignited into flames without help. 
He also states that the experts disagreed about the use 
of accelerants. This assertion is not true. All three experts 
stated that some of the burn patterns were consistent with the 
use of an accelerant (T. 53, 170, 210). James Ashby thought that 
the burn pattern was also consistent with some of the materials 
in the structure falling onto the floor during the fire (T. 284). 
He stated that he was not willing to conclude that an accelerant 
was used based solely upon visual inspection of the burn pattern 
(T. 284). Ashby disagreed only with Larsen's opinion that there 
was widespread use of an accelerant (T. 283). He would limit his 
opinion that an accelerant could have bsen used to the area 
surrounding the point of origin (T. 283). When Ashby was 
informed at trial that the crime lab had found light range 
hydrocarbons in the carpet samples, he said it was a "fairly good 
indication" that an accelerant was used (T. 284). 
Defendant fails to acknowledge the evidence that he was 
planning to demolish the building and had obtained insurance on 
it only 3 months prior to the fire (T. 153). It was going to 
cost about $1700-1800 to demolish the building (T. 331). He also 
fails to point out that even if the fire had started accidentally 
under any theory, it could not have grown to *che size it was at 
the time fire fighters arrived without defendant having noticed 
smoke in the building when he was inside it only minutes before 
(T. 59, 177, 180-82, 200, 226). This evidence, along with all of 
the evidence outlined in the Statement of Facts above was 
sufficient to establish that defendant committed arson. 
Defendant also contends that the evidence of insurance 
fraud is insufficient because the crime cannot be established 
merely by showing that arson occurred and a claim was filed. He 
asserts that the prosecutor's reliance on this alternative theory 
requires reversal of his conviction for insurance fraud. His 
claim is based upon his assertion that State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 
123 (Utah 1986), does not hold that the crime of insurance fraud 
can be established by proving that defendant burned his building 
and then submitted a claim. The State agrees that Nickles does 
not hold that insurance fraud may rely upon the fact of arson 
along with the filing of a claim; however, Nickles does not rule 
out that possibility. Nickles simply did not consider the issue. 
The insurance fraud statute, however, does define the crime in 
this manner, 
Utah Code Ann- § 76-6-521 (1978) provides: 
Every person who presents, or causes to be 
presented, any false or fraudulent claim, or 
any proof in support of any such claim, upon 
any contract of insurance for the payment of 
any loss, or who prepares, makes or 
subscribes any account, certificate of 
survey, affidavit or proof of loss, or other 
book, paper or writing, with intent to 
present or use the same, or to allow it to be 
presented or used, in support of any such 
claim is punishable as in the manner 
prescribed for theft of property of like 
value. 
(Emphasis added.) This language includes both the person who 
inflates a claim and the person who submits an otherwise false or 
fraudulent claim. The claim in this case was a false or 
fraudulent claim because it was an invalid claim — one that the 
insurance carrier would not pay if it knew that the claimant had 
started the fire. It was fraudulent because -che Proof of Loss 
Statement included a certification that the claimant had not 
caused the fire. It was also an inflated claim because it 
exceeded the value of the property. 
In this case, the insurance claims investigator for 
Ohio Casualty, defendant's insurance carrier, testified that the 
claim would not have been paid if the company believed that the 
fire was intentionally set (T. 145). This evidence established 
that defendant filed a fraudulent claim if he also started the 
fire. The Proof of Loss Statement required defendant to certify 
that he did not cause the fire which resulted in the claim. 
There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude 
* i.,i^ *- ,'nsnrance claim on this basis. 
Even if it were true that insurance fraud could not 
rest upon the fact of aggravated arson coupled with an insurance 
claim that the company would not have paid if they knew the 
claimant had committed arson, there was sufficient evidence of an 
inflated claim for this Court to affirm the verdict. The claim 
was for nearly $25,000. The property was worth only $13,000. 
This evidence alone established an excessive claim. Defendant's 
conviction of insurance fraud should stand. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE A 
REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS INSTRUCTION 
TO THE JURY. 
Defendant complains that the trial court refused to 
give a "reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction to the 
jury. He acknowledges that such an instruction is normally not 
required, but claims that it was required in this case because 
the jury was not properly instructed upon the definition of a 
reasonable doubt. 
First, it is important to note that the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly held that a trial court is not required to 
instruct on the reasonable alternative hypothesis if the jury is 
instructed on the reasonable doubt standard. State v. Cloud, 722 
P.2d 750, 755-56 (Utah 1986); State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 725 
(Utah 1982). As argued below, the jury was adequately instructed 
in this case on the reasonable doubt standard. 
Second, while trial counsel did request a reasonable 
alternative hypothesis instruction (R. 66), and did object to its 
refusal (T. 407), he did not argue that the instruction was 
needed because the reasonable d -.tiuns w^r^ inadequate. 
In fact, the reasonable doubt instruction ••ffprf*: - -pndiir.i 
was precisely Mn* juinir .:is that r. ;• - • . T I' R dl) 
Thus, defendant raises ;or thp i_ appeal ••,-*, that 
tiif iuiy was improperly instructed on this ground - , - . T , 
should not ente * ie;t.i~^ which . - r..ad~ fox \h€- :;rs\ 
time ( :\ appec . , State v. Noren, •" >; r " * ' * *.\. 1985) 
(i • .• defendant to establish that claimed deficiency xu 
instructions given was broi. . lal court's attention). 
Even if this Court were to consider • -*.-.-'..:* 5 claim, 
he is not enf it ]o«i ft« reversal of his convictions. At the time 
of trial in this case, -. . -. ~: d w ; • announced 
its displeasure with the particular reasonable - .; .*-•;.. .ion 
that was givt-n 1 n ihi1 rap* See State v. Ireland; . : 
1375, 1380 (Utah 1989); State v. Johnso,. zu x±-« **} 
Ireland -. majority *\f vne C\. u: t jnvoK-. . : 3 
supervisory . -*r.\*::t\ courts and instructed that use 
of the "more weightv affairs : * ..'*-- . e ui imaginary" 
lariyua* - -s uiu u*= iiscontinued - Court u 1 not reverse the 
conviction because *u instructed : . *equ; JCC1 
language, nearly identical * ».. u^ed in in-it j ±-u a 2 
( -\ir<-* ^^at *« State had the ourden to pr 
guilt beyori -1 reasonaD.r defendant :s ; resumed 
innocent and * ^,1:* ; ^ : *- acquitta . t- . *s his 
gui L?ey", e uuubi Th^se jr:>:t; actions were 
sufficient - ^ *ns - * convict 1 ^  and 
fh was iiKj »- ' : i refusing defendant'R 
alternative * t ho: 1 «. instruction. 
In Johnson/ even though a majority of the Court thought 
that the reasonable doubt instructions were inadequate, the 
conviction was affirmed because there was no reasonable 
likelihood of a different result even if a proper instruction had 
been given. 774 P.2d at 1146, 1149. The evidence in this case 
overwhelmingly demonstrated an intentional fire that was set by 
defendant. There is no reasonable likelihood of a different 
result even if the jury had been differently instructed. 
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL. 
Defendant alleges that trial counsel was ineffective by 
failing to object to the expert opinions on the basis discussed 
in Point II, above. This issue can be easily resolved by 
reference to Point II. Where there was no prejudice from 
admission of the expert opinion, ineffectiveness cannot be 
established. 
In evaluating an ineffective counsel claim, this Court 
must determine both that counsel rendered a deficient performance 
that fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment and that defendant was prejudiced by the performance 
before it may reverse defendant's conviction. State v. Gardner, 
P.2d , 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 12 (1989); State v. Carter, 
776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989). Defendant must overcome a strong 
presumption that counsel was adequate. State v. Bullock, 
P.2d , 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 36 (1989); State v. Moritzsky, 
771 P.2d 688, 690 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Prejudice is established 
where t> * • verdict is undermined 
because there ,- a reasonable like! v -rent reau/. if 
performed deficiently. State v. Morehouse, ' * 
P.2d 
Here, there v i. deficient perl 
.' -* e to object the experts naming defendant in 
their opinions about how the ,fin.: stalled, It was objectively 
reasonable for counsel to determine that their use c fui 
client' : *f «v* th- nature c: their 
opinions which cast suspicion . ;. :.^ event. 
Nevertheless, even if it was deficient performance not tu object 
tt. the test.:* .-
 A t ^ ejudice from counsel's failure 
to object, As argued above, aefendani. dUm.i t ted being the last 
. - :
 J
 building prior * :.e t . rt There were no other 
suspects - ; i.tional i -. , * n 'hat there was no 
smoke •*<: :* •;•• building • -. unbelievable given 'IK :ze of 
the ig±n. 
It is unlikely * * j, nineci that defendant 
was the culprit merely because K '. experts used i 
expres r ont> m * » • * e fire started. It i •- more 
likely that the jury would hav* < fendant oi the crimes 
even xf Ui* experts had merely stated that a. unnamed ir 
had engage escribing 1 • r.*=-• *-. fact 
that - f • . • - .-. • r,rt. .. *.- - • * lint left the 
• rdei £L* . t t, ?-. *- *:-* . t h^ size it wa« at Lhe 
time : *. i - lghters resjioiidiMl w.ns sufficient to eliminate other 
culprits. Because defendant has not established 1 >i 'U-': ieni 
performance and prejudice, his claim must fail. State v. Frame, 
723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm defendant's convictions. 
DATED this Z- day of February, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent, was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Gary W. Pendleton, attorney for defendant, 150 North 200 East, 
Suite 202, St. George, Utah 84770, this / day of February, 
1990. 
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YES. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2) 
22 
23 
24 
25 
HE DO MOST OF HIS WORK OUT IN THE FIELD AT 
PEOPLE'S HOMES OF ™ THE OFFICE? 
A. M 
BRING 11 I'". H 
Q. 
A. YES. 
THEY HAD TO REPAIR A CLOCK, THEY WOULD 
•7P P^ A LOT 
Hi INSTALLATION ALSO? 
RS IN THE F I E L D . 
Q . 
A. 
Q. 
h i l) III \\\\ l \ 'I KL'CK HE WOULD USE: 
Y E S . 
WHERE WOULD HF H U 1 HIS TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT FOH 
INSTALLATIONS? 
A. USUALLY IN THE TRUCK. 
MR. METOS: THAT'S ALL I HAVE. 
MR. JONES: NOTHING I -"HER. 
THI COURT: YOU MAY STEP DOWN. 
MR. METOS: MAY SHE PF hXCUSED? 
MR, JUNKS: NO OBJECTION. 
THF COURT: YF", SHE MAY. 
MP. MFTi'S: »L wuLLD CALL WAYNE WARDLE 
WAYNE WARDLE 
CALLED AS ITNESS HEREIN, HAVING BEEN DULY 
SWORN, Tfr i t I Lb AS FOLLOWS: 
ii i m i 'i' ^ ,',AM i M M i ON 
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1 BY MR. METOS: 
2 Q. WOULD YOU STATE YOUR NAME, AND SPELL YOUR LAST 
3 NAME, PLEASE? 
4 A. WAYNE WARDLE. W-A-R-D-L-E. 
5 Q. WAYNE, YOU'RE THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE, 
6 CORRECT? 
7 A. YES. 
8 Q. DIRECTING YOUR ATTENTION TO THE MORNING OF 
9 OCTOBER 20TH OF 1986, DO YOU RECALL THAT MORNING? 
10 A. VERY DEFINITELY. 
11 Q. SOMETIME THAT MORNING DID YOU GO TO YOUR 
12 OFFICE? 
13 A. YES, I DID. 
14 Q. ABOUT WHAT TIME? 
15 A. I THINK IT WAS 6:30, QUARTER TO 7:00. 
16 Q. WHY IS IT YOU KENT IN? 
17 A. JUST TO GET THE PAPERWORK DONE, GO THROUGH THE 
18 MAIL, POST ANY CHECKS WE RECEIVED OVER THE WEEKEND. 
19 Q. IS THAT SOMETHING YOU GENERALLY DO? 
20 A. YES. 
21 Q. WHETHER IT WAS MONDAY OR TUESDAY OR WHATEVER? 
22 A. WELL, EVERY DAY EXCEPT PROBABLY SUNDAY, 
23 SATURDAY. 
24 Q. WEEKENDS YOU DID NOT GENERALLY GO IN? 
25 A. NOT GENERALLY. 
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1 HOW LONG WERE YOU AT THE OFFICE? 
2 ABOUT A HAM I). H H , 'i> MINUTES. 
3 Q. AND ABOUT WHAT TIME? 
4 AS I TRIED TO RECRE* THOUGHT I WAS 
5 ABOUT HOME ABOl l nvt
 ni 1L:-. 7:l.)l). 
6 Q. AND WHILE YOU WERf- IHII-I , DID YOU NOTICE ANY 
7 SMELLS OR ANYTHING UNUSUAL? 
8 A. I DID NOT. 
9 Q. CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE OFFICE BUILDING FOR THE 
10 JURY, WHAT CONDITION IT WAS IN AT THAT TIME? 
11 A. BASICALLY IT WAS A 40 YEARS OLD HOUSE WE HAD 
12 BOUGHT, THAT HAD BEEN CONVERTED TO AN OFFICE FROM A HOME. 
13 AN OLD MAN HAD LIVED IN I -'MSELF, HIS WIFE HAD DIED 12 
14 YEARS EARLIER. BASICALLY !; WAS FILTHY WHEN WE GOT IT, A 
15 LOT OF ODORS. Wc "*n TAKFN Or THI SIDING OFF THE OUTSIDE 
16 OF THE HOUSE IN PREPARATION TO DEMOLISH THE BUILDING AND, 
17 YOU KNOW, '-^  'UST AN OLD BI AT >U' HOUSE. BUT THE 
18 UPSTAIRS - - •• i^  Ai WAS CLEAN AND PRESENTABLE. 
19 Q. PRIOR TO LEAVING, DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT THE LAST 
">ft THTNr. i'. TD? 
n ... BULLED •• DOORKNOB, PUSH Hi THI' hrtOB AND PULLED 
22 THE DOOR T. 
23 Q . A. • AtPF AT YOI'R DESK, WHA I w '• '- THE LAST 
24 THING Y^ *1 WFR 
25 A. SEEMS LIKE I WAS POSTING SOME INVOICES. _-h 
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1 SEVERAL PHONECALLS. EVERYBODY THAT WANTS TO DEAL WITH ME, 
2 KNOWS THEY CAN CALL ME AT THAT TIME TO REACH ME. I HAD 
3 TALKED TO TEDDY, WHEN I CALLED HER OR SHE CALLED ME, I 
4 DON'T RECALL, BUT BASICALLY SHE SAID SHE WAS GOING TO JUMP 
5 IN THE SHOWER AND WOULD BE READY TO GO IN A FEW MINUTES. 
6 Q. TEDDY IS YOUR WIFE? 
7 A. YES. 
8 Q. DO YOU RECALL MOVING OR CHANGING THE POSITION 
9 OF A GARBAGE SACK YOU HAD ON THE FLOOR? 
10 A. I RECALL THAT WHEN I OPENED THE BOTTOM DRAWER 
11 TO PUT SOME INVOICES IN, THERE WAS A SACK THERE, THAT WAS 
12 IN THE ROAD. THERE WAS A LOT OF MATERIAL THERE AND I DID 
13 KICK IT OUT OF THE ROAD. 
14 Q. WHY DON'T YOU STEP UP TO EXHIBIT 12 HERE AND 
15 POINT OUT TO THE JURY WHERE THE SACK WAS. 
16 A. IT WAS JUST BY THE BOTTOM DRAWER. 
17 Q. YOU'RE INDICATING THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF YOUR 
18 DESK? 
19 A. WHEN I OPENED THAT DRAWER, THE SACK WAS 
20 DIRECT -- WASN'T DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF IT, BUT ENOUGH IN THE 
21 ROAD WHERE IT INTERFERED WITH OPENING IT, SO I JUST KICKED 
22 IT OUT OF THE ROAD. 
23 Q. YOU KICKED IT TO THE NORTH AND SOMEWHAT TO THE 
24 WEST? 
25 A. YEAH. 
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1 Q. YOU JUST REMEMBER KICKING IT? 
2 A. - "*c IN MY WAY. 
3 Q. DO YOU ; WHAT WAS IN THAT SACK? 
4 . BASICALLY OFFICE GARBAGE, STYROFOAM CUPS, 
5 WENDY'S CUPS, TYPE THING, YOU KNOW, MAI J, 1 HAD GONE THROUGH 
6 AND THROWN AWAY; JUST BASIC OFFICE GARBAGE. 
7 Q. YOU MENTIONED -- YOU HAD A DISCUSSION WITH THE 
8 VARIOUS FIRE INVESTIGATORS ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THAT BAG, 
9 DID YOU NOT? 
10 A. VERY SUPERFICIAL. I MEAN I'VE NEVER BEEN TRULY 
11 QUESTIONED BECAUSE I NEVER REALLY THOUGHT ABOUT IT. 
12 Q. BUT YOU MENTIONED CUPS AND THE WAX COVERED 
13 PAPER CUPS. WHY IS IT YOU BELIEVE YOU WOULD HAVE HAD SOME 
14 OF THOSE CUPS IN RE? 
15 A. AT .- •<•• WAS DRINKING ABOUT TWO BIG GULPS 
16 A DAY. OUP l-'hACTICE WAS TO EAT BREAKFAST OUT. WE WOULD GO 
17 TO WENDY'S FOR LUNCH. YOU KNOW, WHEN YOU WORK 16 HOURS A 
18 DAY T-
19 Q. YOU'RE EATING JUNK FOOD A LOT? 
20 A. YEAH. 
21 Q. HOW BIG IS THIS SACK? 
22 A. ACTUALLY ALMOST THE EXACT SACK AS THE Hr*^ > 
23 SACK OVER THERE. 
24 Q. JUST A LARGE GROCERY SACK? 
31 
1 Q. WAS IT PAPER OR PLASTIC? 
2 A. IT WAS EXACTLY LIKE THAT HARMON SACK. 
3 Q. PAPER. AND CAN YOU DESCRIBE HOW MUCH MATERIAL 
4 WAS IN THERE? 
5 A. WELL, IT WAS HEAPED OVER. 
6 Q. IS THERE SOME REASON YOU DIDN'T CARRY IT OUT 
7 AND PUT IT IN THE GARBAGE OR GARBAGE CAN? 
8 A. BECAUSE WE WERE ANTICIPATING DETROY1NG THE 
9 BUILDING, BOTH BUILDINGS, WE HAD CANCELLED OUR DUMPSTER 
10 SERVICE SINCE WE WERE PUTTING IT IN A CONTAINER TO DEMOLISH 
11 THE BUILDING, SO WE DIDN'T HAVE A DUMPSTER. 
12 Q. SO YOU DIDN'T BOTHER TO TAKE IT OUT? 
13 A. WE HAD A TRUCK WE STORED GARBAGE IN, BUT IT 
14 WASN'T THAT BIG OF A DEAL. 
15 Q. NOW YOU SAID — HOW LONG BEFORE YOU LEFT THE 
16 OFFICE DID YOU MOVE THAT PAPER SACK? 
17 A. IT SEEMS LIKE THAT'S WHY I KICKED IT. I'VE 
18 TRIED TO RECREATE IT. SEEMS LIKE WHAT I WAS DOING IS I WAS 
19 GETTING THIS FILE OUT OF MY DRAWER OR PUTTING IT BACK IN. 
20 I CAN'T RECALL, BUT I THINK I WAS GETTING IT OUT, AND THE 
21 PHONE HAD RANG AND IT WAS TEDDY AND, YOU KNOW, I KICKED THE 
22 SACK BECAUSE I COULDN'T REACH IT FROM THE PHONE. AND I PUT 
23 THE FILE IN OR TOOK IT OUT, AND AT THAT POINT I HUNG UP AND 
24 THAT'S WHEN I WENT HOME. 
25 Q. YOU LEFT IMMEDIATELY? 
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1 A. VPPV «H .- Y. 
2 • Q. Ai,L RIGHT. YOU GO OUTSIDE THE DOOR: WAS THERE 
3 ANYONE OUTSIDE? 
4 A. tKlC PALMER. 
5 Q. HOW DO YOU KNOW MR. PLUMBER? 
6 A. HE'S A INTEND OF MINE. 
7 Q. WHAT WAS HE DOING OUTSIDl THE DOOR? 
8 A. HE • -'i'S NEIGHBOR AND HE WAS WALKING 
9 PAST MY BUILDING TO GO TO SCHOOL. 
10 Q. DID YOU TELL MR. LARSEN YOU HAD SEEN ERIC 
11 PALMER THAT MORNING? 
12 A. I DID. 
13 Q. WHAT DID YOU DO AFTER YOU TALKED WITH MR. 
14 PALMER? 
15 A. < > •• Ktu HIM A HILSL, EXCHANGED SOME 
16 PLEASANTRIES, NICE KID "F DIDN'T WA\ • WANTED 
17 |i WMI '.h HAChU) (.'Ui ut iriL DRIVEWAY AV; W* \ : HOME. 
18 Q. WHAT fUli YOU DO WHEN YOU GOT HOME? 
19 A. V I IM.'rMI,, . GREETED M* r.lDS ON THE WAY OUT. 
20 Q. PASSED THEM? 
-
11
 A. i I -ii SNriS [,IM W Hrtu juai SOME 
CONVERSATION, YOU KNuU Nil] A HIG DFAL, AND WAITED FOR 
2 1 WIFE TO GET OUT <)l I Ml IIHOWI h 
24 l.,,^  vvLRt YOU PLANNING TO DO? WHERE WERE YOU 
">c cntwr. TO en' 
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1 A. AS I RECALL, I THINK WE WERE JUST GOING TO GO 
2 DOWN TO MCDONALD'S, GO TO THE DRIVE UP, GET SOMETHING, 
3 BRING IT BACK TO HER OFFICE. 
4 Q. AND WHERE WAS HER OFFICE? 
5 A. WE HAD TWO BUILDINGS; MY OFFICE IS THE ONE THAT 
6 CAUGHT ON FIRE AND HER OFFICE WAS RIGHT NEXT DOOR. 
7 • Q. WHAT SORT OF BUSINESS DOES SHE HAVE? 
8 A. SHE HAS ALMOST PERFECT AEROBICS. 
9 Q. NOW AS YOU WERE DRIVING DOWN THE STREET -- WHAT 
10 ROUTE DID YOU TAKE TO GO — WHERE IS MCDONALD'S LOCATED? 
11 A. LOCATED ON 5900 SOUTH AND STATE. 
12 Q. WHAT ROUTE DID YOU TAKE TO GET THERE? 
13 A. WHEN I WENT HOME I PULLED IN FRONT OF MY YARD. 
14 WHEN WE LEFT I MADE A "U" TURN AND WENT TWO AND A HALF 
15 BLOCKS PAST MY BUILDING. 
16 Q. ALL RIGHT. AND DID YOU NOTICE ANYTHING UNUSUAL 
17 AS YOU WERE DRIVING TOWARDS MCDONALD'S? 
18 A. JUST A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF COMMOTION, SMOKE, 
19 SIRENS. 
20 Q. AND WHAT HAPPENED WHEN YOU GOT TO YOUR 
21 BUILDING? 
22 A. WHEN WE GOT THERE, AT FIRST WE THOUGHT IT WAS A 
23 CAR FIRE ON THE FREEWAY, BECAUSE THE FREEWAY IS HERE AND 
24 THEN HER BUILDING AND MY BUILDING. AND OUR BUILDINGS WERE 
25 OBSTRUCTED BY THE FREEWAY SYSTEM. AS WE GOT CLOSER WE SEEN 
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1 K BUILDING OR MY BUILDING. AND THEN 
2 WE THOUGHT IT WAS THE NEIGHBORS BUILDING, THE THIRD 
3 hi li,l>INi,. A'. Wl HOI hi' CLOSE TO IT, AN ETERNITY OF TIME 
4 GOES PAST, AND SMOKE WAS JUST BLOWING OUT OF MY BUILDING. 
5 O. WH* O? 
6 «. I PULLED IN HER PARKING LOT, WENT ABOUT 50 FEET 
7 OVER TO MY DOOR. THERE WERE TW. > I IREMEN THAT LOOKED LIKE 
8 THEY WERE TRYING TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO. AND THEY ASKED ME 
9 IF I WAS THE OWNER, I TOLD THEM YES. THEY SAID DO YOU HAVE 
10 A KEY TO THE BUILDING. 1 SAID YLS. SO I WENT UP TO THE 
11 DOOR, TRIED TO UNLOCK THE DOOR. I FUMPTFO W IT, I 
12 COULDN'T LI I II TO OPEN, u HAL, iuNu Oi A HANG UP, ANYWAY. 
13 AND MY EXACT WORDS WERE, "KICK THE DOOR". I KTPKFn THE 
1 DOOR IN, AND THE FIREMEN WENT IN AND I WAS THE THIRD ONE 
15 IN. 
16 n. you • -• !- NS ABOUT THIS 
17 SOLDERING IRON OVER THE LAST COUPLE DAYS? 
18 A. OVER 'I HI 1/iSl 1'1,1'1'M U^RS. 
19 Q. DO lOU RM'ALL 1 HI- LAST II ML BEFORE THE 20TH OF 
20 OCTOBER THAT YOU USE1 I HA'I SOI PI K 1 
21 A. WELL, I RECALL THAT 1 DID USI- IT THE PREVIOUS 
22 WEEK. 
23 Q. *uu UUN i RECALL SPECIFICALLY WHAT DAY? 
24 A. I Dn NOT, 
25 Q. Do \<>V REMEMBER IF YOU HAD UNPLUGGED IT? 
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1 A. I DON'T THINK I DID. 
2 Q. WHERE HAD YOU USED IT? 
3 A. ON MY DESK. 
4 Q. AND WHAT WERE YOU DOING WITH IT? 
5 A. IT SEEMED LIKE ONE OF THE RADIOS IN ONE OF OUR 
6 TRUCKS HAD DEVELOPED A STATIC. AND THE WIRES HAD PULLED 
7 OUT OF THE JACK SO I BROUGHT IT IN TO JUST SOLDER IT. 
8 WE'RE TALKING FIVE SECONDS OF SOLDER. 
9 Q. SO YOU JUST SOLDERED A WIRE ON? 
10 A. YES. 
11 Q. DO YOU RECALL MOVING THAT SOLDERING IRON 
12 ANYPLACE? 
13 A. I DON'T. 
14 Q. YOU HEARD THE INVESTIGATOR FROM WEST VALLEY 
15 TALK ABOUT A TRIGGER TYPE SOLDERING IRON. DID YOU HAVE 
16 SOME DISCUSSION WITH FIRE INVESTIGATORS, ABOUT A TRIGGER 
17 TYPE SOLDERING IRON? 
18 A. THAT'S THE ONE I NORMALLY USED. IT'S A LITTLE 
19 BIT BIGGER AND IT'S LIKE A GUN. YOU LIFT IT UP, PULL THE 
20 TRIGGER, THREE, FOUR SECONDS, IT'S HOT ENOUGH YOU CAN 
21 ACTUALLY DO YOUR SOLDERING. YOU PUT IT BACK DOWN, WHEN YOU 
22 RELEASE THE TRIGGER IT COOLS DOWN VERY, VERY FAST. 
23 Q. DO YOU SPECIFICALLY RECALL THOUGH HAVING USED 
24 THAT PENCIL -- AFTER YOU WERE QUESTIONED, DID YOU 
25 SPECIFICALLY RECALL HAVING USED THAT PENCIL TYPE SOLDERING 
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1 IRON? 
2 * aPTF
 ; ' CAME BACK TO ME THAT 
3 WAS wnrti x HAD UUNL *Hs -• TO USE "'Y SOLDERING IRON. 
4 Q. T»* TRIGGER >. > E? 
5 A. THE TRIGGER TYPE, THE ONE 1 ALWAYS USE, I 
6 COULDN'T FIND TT, AND WENT DOWNS I-MRS J,«.oK IN., H >V SOMETHING 
7 ELSE. I FOUND THAT ONE, BROUGHT IT UPSTAIRS, PLUGGED IT 
8 IN, SOLDERED AND SET " BACK DOWN. 
9 Q. WHERE iuU PLUG IT IN? 
10 A. INTO MY POWER STRIP THAT IS BY MY DESK. 
11 Q. AND IS THAT ON THE FLOOR? 
12 A. YES. 
13 Q. NOW IN THE AREA AROUND YOUR DESK YOU'VE HEARD 
14 DESCRIBED THERE WAS A PLASTIC GARBAGE CAN; IS THAT CORRECT? 
15 *. WHAT TT , -i.v i WAS USING 
16 FOR / GARBAGE CAN. 
17 FLOWER POT HOLDER? 
18 A. YES. 
19 •-'" •"" ROUND OR SQUARE? 
A. - FKCITY A GOOD SIZED ONE. 
Jl Q. " THF JURORS t AN St E "lUM imiiS. 
A. • AND ABOUT THIS TALL. 
2i (INDICATING) 
^ Q. V.HI SAY THIS KMI INI i, TWO TO TWO AND A HALF FEET 
2J ROUND IN DIAMETER? 
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1 A. PROBABLY, MAYBE NOT THAT BIG. 
2 Q. MAYBE ABOUT 12 INCHES IN DEPTH? 
3 A. DEEPER. IT WAS FOR A PALM TREE. 
4 Q. YOU HAD USED THAT AS A GARBAGE CAN? 
5 A. AS A GARBAGE CONTAINER. 
6 Q. THAT'S WHERE YOU WOULD PUT GARBAGE? 
7 A. YEAH. 
8 Q. WHAT TYPE OF MATERIALS WERE IN THERE? 
9 A. WELL, THAT'S THE MATERIAL THAT'S MELTED. 
10 Q. IN FRONT OF THE SPEAKER? 
11 A. ACTUALLY, I THOUGHT IT WAS IN THAT GROUP. IT 
12 WAS SOME TYPE OF PLASTIC. 
13 Q. DO YOU RECALL WHERE THAT CONTAINER WAS LOCATED 
14 PRIOR TO THE FIRE? 
15 A. IT SEEMS LIKE IT WAS RIGHT NEXT TO THE WINDOW, 
16 BUT I'M NOT SURE; SOMEPLACE IN THAT AREA. 
17 Q. SOMEPLACE IN THE AREA BETWEEN THE WINDOW TO 
18 YOUR DESK? 
19 A. WELL, FROM THE WINDOW TO MY DESK, BUT NOT 
20 NECESSARILY TOWARDS THE SPEAKERS. I JUST DON'T REMEMBER. 
21 Q. YOU DON'T RECALL? 
22 A. WE TRIED TO RECONSTRUCT IT. 
23 Q. OTHER THAN THE CONTAINER THAT YOU USED, AS, I 
24 GUESS, A TRASH RECEPTICAL, WERE THERE OTHER ITEMS ALONG 
25 THIS NORTH WALL? 
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1 A. YLAH, TMh WHOLE WALL WAS FULL. IT'S KIND OF A 
2 CATCH-ALL. 
3 Q . fc • u • " iwu hrivL ALONG THE WALL? 
A. PHONEBOOKS i-OR ARIZONA AND NEVADA, PROBABLY 20 
PHONEBOOKS. 
6 . WERE THEY STACKED if IN A PILE OR LINED UP? 
7 A. BETWEEN THF FAS'I >vM,l, ^ M' TH1- WEST WALL THERE 
8 WAS STAND' ABLES, AND MATERIAL ALONG JUST ABOUT THE 
9 ENTIRE WALL. 
10 0. WHAT SORT OF TABLES WERE THEY? 
11 ... \ CHEAP TABLE YOU BUY AT K-MAR , ^TACKABLE. 
12 n. WF T MADE OUT OF? 
13 A. SOME SORT OF PLASTIC. 
14 *? ru WAS THhR} A BASKET OF ANY SORT THERE? 
15 A. WE HAD ALL OF OUR FAMILY ALBUMS. 
16 Q. PHOTOGRAP I AliUMS? 
17 A. PICTURES, PHOTOGRAPHS, JUST, YOU KNOW, THROUGH 
18 OUR WHOLE MARRIED LIFE. THI'i WFHK THFRF. 
19 Q. HOW WERE THEY CONTAINED? 
20 A. JUST IN A LAUNDRY HASKM. 
21 Q. WHAT WAS THE LAUNDRY BASKET MADE OF? 
22 A. SOME SORT OF PLASTIC. 
23 Q. THAI l\ CONSUMED IN FIRE? 
«.-; A. WE SAVED A LOT or m,,t". PICTURES, Ml I' < Mt F> "" * 
oc:
 LOT Tl \\ \ i I V I I,i)N K i 
1 Q. NOW YOU HEARD THE STIPULATION REGARDING THE 
2 PLANNED RENOVATION THAT YOU HAD; IS THAT CORRECT? 
3 A. YES. 
4 Q. YOU ALSO DID GO AND DISCUSS THE DEMOLITION O 
5 THIS BUILDING AND OBTAINING A DEMOLITION PERMIT WITH THE 
6 PEOPLE IN MURRAY CITY? 
7 A. WE DISCUSSED IT, BUT WE DID NOT PURCHASE IT 
8 THAT TIME. 
9 Q. WHAT WAS YOUR UNDERSTANDING AT THAT TIME OF 
10 WHAT HAD TO BE DONE TO OBTAIN A DEMOLITION PERMIT? 
11 A. I HAD TO HAVE THE BOARD OF HEALTH COME IN. 
12 Q. WHAT WERE THEY TO CHECK FOR? 
13 A. ASBESTOS. 
14 Q. HAD YOU HAD THAT DONE? 
15 A. YES. 
16 Q. HAD YOU PASSED THE ASBESTOS CHECK? 
17 A. YES. 
18 Q. WHAT ELSE HAD TO BE DONE? 
19 A. PAY A $25.00 FEE. 
20 Q. WAS THERE A SEWER OR WATER DISCONNECT FEE? 
21 A. WE WEREN'T GOING TO DISCONNECT IT. 
22 Q. AS A RESULT OF THE FIRE, DID YOU HAVE TO 
23 OBTAIN THE DEMOLITION PERMIT ALSO? 
24 A. NO. WE WEREN'T REQUIRED TO, BUT WE DID. 
25 Q. YOU DID IN FACT GET A DEMOLITION PERMIT? 
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1 A. WE STILL HAD TO HAVE IT BEFORE WE COULD 
2 DESTRUCT THE BUILDING. 
3 Q. THAT'S WHAT I MEANT. YOU DID OBTAIN ONE? 
4 A. YES. 
5 Q. YOU'VE HEARD TESTIMONY ABOUT VARIOUS 
6 DISCUSSIONS YOU HAD WITH PEOPLE, ABOUT THE -- SPECIFICALLY 
7 WITH DEAN LARSEN AND MR. ASHBY; IS THAT RIGHT? 
8 A. YES. 
9 Q. HOW MANY DISCUSSIONS DID YOU HAVE WITH DEAN 
10 LARSEN? 
11 A. THE DAY OF THE FIRE WE HAD SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS 
12 THAT MORNING, AND WHEN WE HAD GATHERED EVERYTHING WE COULD 
13 GATHER, THROWN OUT THE WINDOW, PHOTO ALBUM, RECORDS, STUFF 
14 LIKE THAT, AND HE TOLD ME THEY WERE GOING TO GO AHEAD AND 
15 CHECK THE BUILDING, THAT I REALLY WASN'T NEEDED THERE, I 
16 WENT HOME AND TOOK A SHOWER. ABOUT -- IN FACT, I WAS STILL 
17 IN THE SHOWER, THE MURRAY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT CALLED AND 
18 ASKED IF I WOULD GO TO DEAN'S CAR AND MEET HIM. WE HAVE A 
19 LARGE DOG, AND HE DIDN'T WANT TO COME THROUGH THE YARD BY 
20 THE DOG. 
21 Q. LET ME ASK YOU SOME SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT 
22 THOSE CONVERSATIONS. DID MR. LARSEN ASK YOU ABOUT THE LACK 
23 OF EQUIPMENT IN THE BUILDING? 
24 A. SEEMS LIKE WE DISCUSSED THAT. 
25 Q. WHAT DO YOU RECALL TELLING MR. LARSEN ABOUT WHY 
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1 THERE WAS NO EQUIPMENT IN THE BUILDING? 
2 A. THE FACT ALL OUR EQUIPMENT, 99 PERCENT, IS IN 
3 THE TRUCK. 
4 Q. WHY IS THAT? 
5 A. BECAUSE WE DO SERVICE WORK AT PEOPLE'S HOMES. 
6 Q. MOST THE WORK YOU DO IS ON LOCATION OR ON-SITE? 
7 A. RIGHT. 
8 Q. DID YOU HAVE A DISCUSSION WITH MR. LARSEN ABOUT 
9 SHUTTING DOWN THE BUSINESS? 
10 A. NO, I DIDN'T. 
11 Q. DID YOU DISCUSS WITH HIM WHAT YOUR BUSY AND OFF 
12 SEASONS WERE? 
13 A. I DON'T RECALL THAT, BUT I KNOW WE WERE GOING 
14 INTO OUR OFF SEASON, NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER. 
15 Q. AND YOUR BUSY SEASON IS WHEN? 
16 A. MARCH 15TH THROUGH PROBABLY NOVEMBER 15TH. 
17 Q. ALL RIGHT, DID MR. LARSEN MAKE ANY ACCUSATIONS 
18 AT YOU AT THAT TIME? 
19 A. NOT IN THE MORNING, BUT IN THE AFTERNOON WHEN 
20 HE HAD CAME DOWN TO MY HOUSE, HE BASICALLY ACCUSED ME OF 
21 SETTING FIRE TO MY BUILDING, AND TOLD ME THAT HE HAD ALL 
22 THE EVIDENCE THAT HE NEEDED TO ARREST ME, AND PULLED BACK 
23 HIS BELT, HIS JACKET SO I COULD SEE HIS GUN AND BASICALLY 
24 TRIED TO INTIMIDATE ME EVERY WAY HE COULD. HE OFFERED TO 
25 LET ME MAKE A CONFESSION. 
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1 y. WHAT DID YOU TELL HIM ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF THE 
2 FIRE? 
3 A. WELL, BASED UPON THE WITNESSES THAT I WAS ABLE 
4 TO TALK TO AND BRING TO HIM, MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT 
5 THE BUILDING WAS SECURED, BECAUSE I PERSONALLY KICKED THE 
6 DOOR IN, I'M SURE NO ONE ELSE -- WE HAD A WITNESS THAT SAID 
7 THE WINDOW BLEW OUT. 
8 MR. JONES: OBJECTION, HEARSAY. 
9 THE COURT: SUSTAINED. 
10 Q. (BY MR. METOS) DID YOU TELL HIM IF YOU KNEW 
11 HOW THAT FIRE STARTED? 
12 A. I TOLD HIM THE FIRE COULD NOT HAVE STARTED HOW 
13 HE SUGGESTED IT STARTED. 
14 Q. THE NEXT DAY YOU HAD A DISCUSSION WITH MR. 
15 ASHBY; IS THAT RIGHT? 
16 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
17 Q. WAS THE DISCUSSION YOU JUST HAD, YOU JUST 
18 DESCRIBED, WAS THAT THE BASIS FOR THIS DISCUSSION WITH 
19 ASHBY ABOUT YOUR LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN MR. LARSEN? 
20 A. WELL, MR. ASHBY AND I DISCUSSED MR. LARSEN FOR 
21 ABOUT AN HOUR AND A HALF. 
22 Q. YOU WEREN'T ARRESTED THE DAY OF THE FIRE; IS 
23 THAT RIGHT? 
24 A. NO, I WAS NOT. 
25 Q. IN FACT, CHARGES WERE NOT FILED IN THIS UNTIL 
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1 SOMETIME IN DECEMBER OF 1987? 
2 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
3 Q. NOW, WITH RESPECT TO THE DAMAGE THAT WAS DONE 
4 -- LET ME TALK ABOUT THE INSURANCE CLAIM FIRST. 
5 HOW WAS IT THAT YOU FILED THIS PROOF OF LOSS; 
6 DID YOU DO IT PERSONALLY OR HAVE SOMEONE DO IT FOR YOU? 
7 A. THERE WAS A GENTLEMEN THAT APPROACHED US, 
8 PUBLIC ADJUSTORS. 
9 Q. HOW SOON AFTER THE FIRE DID THEY APPROACH YOU? 
10 A. WHILE THE FIREMEN WERE STILL THERE. 
11 Q. I GUESS THAT'S THE EQUIVALENT OF AMBULANCE 
12 CHASERS. THEY WERE THERE AT THE SCENE OF THE FIRE? 
13 A. WE DISMISSED THEM BECAUSE WE THOUGHT THE SAME 
14 THING. 
15 Q. DID YOU LATER HIRE SOME PUBLIC ADJUSTORS? 
16 A. ACTUALLY, I PHONED THEM BACK. 
17 Q. WHAT DID THEY DO WITH RESPECT TO PREPARING THE 
18 CLAIM? 
19 A. THEY LITERALLY WENT INTO THE BUILDING AND 
20 SIFTED THROUGH EVERYTHING, COUNTED FITTINGS, TIMERS, THEY 
21 FOUND THINGS THAT I JUST NEVER EVEN THOUGHT OF. THEY MADE 
22 A COMPLETE ESTIMATE OF WHAT IT WOULD COST TO REBUILD THE 
23 BUILDING, AND IT WAS JUST VERY, VERY THOROUGH. 
24 Q. WITH RESPECT TO EXHIBIT — 
25 A. I HAVE SOME EXHIBITS UP HERE. 
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1 Q. 1 THINK I'VE GOT IT HERE. EXHIBIT 20, THE 
2 PROOF OF LOSS, THE DOCUMENT THAT'S THE PROOF OF LOSS? 
3 A. YES. 
4 Q. DID THEY PREPARE THAT FOR YOU? 
5 A. THEY DID. 
6 Q. DID YOU DO ANYTHING OTHER THAN SIMPLY SIGN IT? 
7 A. JUST SIGNED IT. 
8 Q. DID YOU REVIEW IT AT ALL? 
9 A. THEY GAVE ME A COPY WHICH I REVIEWED LATER. 
10 Q. YOU REVIEWED IT AFTER YOU SIGNED IT? 
11 A. YEAH, I THINK SO. 
12 Q. YOU NEED TO KEEP YOUR VOICE UP? 
13 A. YES, THAT'S WHAT HAPPENED. 
14 Q. WITH RESPECT TO THE PREPARATION OF THE PROOF OF 
15 LOSS, YOU LET THAT BE DONE BY THE ADJUSTORS? 
16 A. YES, I DID. 
17 Q. YOU WERE PLANNING TO DEMOLISH THE BUILDING. IS 
18 THERE A TIME THAT YOU HAD SET FOR THE DEMOLITION? 
19 A. LATE SUMMER, EARLY FALL. 
20 Q. AS A RESULT OF THIS FIRE IN OCTOBER, DID IT 
21 DISRUPT YOUR BUSINESS IN ANY WAY? 
22 A. WELL, IT DESTROYED A LOT OF OUR RECORDS. WE 
23 COULDN'T TAKE CARE OF OUR BUSINESS THAT WAY. BUT WE WERE 
24 ABLE TO OPERATE BY MY WIFE'S OFFICE. 
25 Q. WITH RESPECT TO THE RECORDS, ARE THERE RECORDS 
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1 -- YOUR JOB IS SPRINKLER INSTALLATION, YARD SPRINKLERS; IS 
2 THAT CORRECT? 
3 A. SPRINKLER INSTALLATION, SPRINKLER REPAIR. 
4 Q. IS ONE OF THE DUTIES YOU HAVE, IS TO DRAIN AND 
5 TURN OFF THE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS IN THE FALL? 
6 A. YES, WE WINTERIZE A LOT OF SYSTEMS. 
7 Q. DID THE LOSS OF YOUR RECORDS INTERFERE WITH 
8 THAT AT ALL? 
9 A. QUITE A BIT. 
10 Q. YOU INDICATED THAT YOU WANTED TO DO THE 
11 DEMOLITION LATE SUMMER OR EARLY FALL. WERE YOU PLANNING TO 
12 DO IT IN 1987? 
13 A. WE WERE GOING TO TRY AND DO IT LATE SUMMER OF 
14 1987, WE SIGNED THE PAPERWORK WITH BRIGHTON BANK WHO HAD 
15 APPROVED THE LOAN. 
16 Q. YOU HAD BEEN QUALIFIED FOR THE LEASE? 
17 A. FOR THE LOAN. 
18 Q. FOR LOAN, I MEAN. 
19 A. YEAH, WE ALREADY HAD THE LOAN, WE ALREADY HAD 
20 IT APPROVED. WE JUST PUT IT ON HOLD. 
21 Q. AND YOU WERE WAITING FOR A TIME THAT WAS 
22 ADVANTAGEOUS TO GO AHEAD? 
2 3 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
24 Q. MR. WARDLE, DID YOU SPREAD ANY ACCELERANTS 
25 AROUND IN YOUR OFFICE ON EITHER THE MORNING OF THE 20TH OR 
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1 SOMETIME PRIOR TO THE 20TH? 
2 A. ABSOLUTELY NOT. 
3 Q. DID YOU INTENTIONALLY SET FIRE TO YOUR OFFICE 
4 ON THAT DATE? 
5 A. I DID NOT. 
6 MR. METOS: I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
7 THE COURT: MR. JONES? 
8 
9 CROSS EXAMINATION 
10 BY MR. JONES: 
11 Q. YOU SAID THIS BUSINESS INVOLVES SPRINKLER 
12 REPAIRS? 
13 A. YES, SIR. 
14 Q. IS THERE ANY OTHER KIND OF BUSINESS YOU 
15 OPERATE; IS THAT THE ONLY KIND OF BUSINESS? 
16 A. I DON'T UNDERSTAND YOUR QUESTION, SIR. 
17 Q. IS IT JUST SPRINKLER REPAIRS; IS THAT ALL YOU 
18 DO? 
19 A. NO, WE DO SPRINKLER REPAIRS AND WE'RE STARTING 
20 TO DO LANDSCAPING. 
21 Q. WHAT ABOUT IN '86, WAS IT JUST LIMITED TO THAT 
22 TYPE OF BUSINESS? 
23 A. NO, THAT'S BASICALLY WHAT WE DID, AS I 
24 DESCRIBED. 
25 Q. SPRINKLER, SPRINKLER REPAIRS? 
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1 A. LANDSCAPING. 
2 THE COURT: I WONDER IF YOU COULD SIT FORWARD 
3 AND TALK INTO THE MIKE. 
4 Q. (BY MR. JONES) THIS FIRE OCCURRED ON A MONDAY 
5 MORNING; IS THAT RIGHT? 
6 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
7 Q. WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME YOU WERE IN THE BUSINESS 
8 BEFORE THE FIRE? 
9 A. MONDAY MORNING. 
10 Q. BUT PRIOR TO THE MONDAY MORNING? 
11 A. PROBABLY FRIDAY. 
12 Q. I'M SORRY? 
13 A. FRIDAY. 
14 Q. FRIDAY ABOUT WHAT TIME? 
15 A. I'M NOT SURE. 
16 Q. WHEN IS IT THAT YOU CLAIMED YOU WOULD HAVE 
17 PLUGGED IN THIS SOLDERING IRON? 
18 A. I'M NOT SURE THAT I KNOW. IT WAS SOMETIME THAT 
19 PREVIOUS WEEK. 
20 Q. SO YOU DON'T KNOW WHETHER IT WOULD HAVE BEEN 
21 FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS OR FOUR DAYS? 
22 A. I DON'T. 
23 Q. AND YOU ADMIT GOING TO THE BUSINESS ABOUT 6:45; 
24 IS THAT RIGHT? 
25 A. WELL, 6:30, 6:45, SOMEPLACE IN THERE. 
3 
1 Q. AND YOU LEFT ABOUT 7:15? 
2 A. I THINK CLOSER TO 7:00, BUT IN THAT RANGE, YE 
3 Q. DID YOU TELL THE INVESTIGATORS THAT YOU LEFT 
4 ABOUT 7:15? 
5 A. I DON'T RECALL WHAT I TOLD THE INVESTIGATORS. 
6 Q. YOU SAY THAT YOU HAD PLANS TO DESTROY THE 
7 BUILDING? 
8 A. WE DID. 
9 Q. IT WAS THAT BUILDING AND ONE OTHER BUILDING? 
10 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
11 Q. AND YOU HAD SUBMITTED THE PLANS FOR THE NEW 
12 BUILDING ALMOST A YEAR PRIOR TO THE FIRE, HADN'T YOU? 
13 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
14 Q. NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER? 
15 A. I DON'T RECALL. 
16 Q. 1985? 
17 A. I DON'T RECALL, A LONG TIME. 
18 Q. WHATEVER THE MURRAY PLANNING RECORDS SHOW? 
19 A. I'M SURE THAT WOULD BE CORRECT. THERE WAS A 
20 LOT OF PREPARATORY WORK AND I KNOW IT WAS A LONG TIME 
21 BEFORE. 
22 Q. THEN YOU WENT IN AND MADE INQUIRY ABOUT A 
23 DEMOLITION PERMIT IN APRIL OF '86, DIDN'T YOU? 
24 A. I DON'T RECALL, BUT THAT SOUNDS LOGICAL. 
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1 IT, TO DESTROY THE BUILDING? 
2 A. THE PERMIT WAS $25. THE HEALTH DEPARTMENT WAS 
3 FREE. 
4 Q. BUT THE COST OF DETROYING THE BUILDING WAS MORE 
5 THAN THAT, WASN'T IT? 
6 A. DEPENDS ON WHAT WE DID AND HOW WE DID IT. THAT 
7 WAS ANOTHER OPTION WE WERE LOOKING AT. 
8 Q. IN ORDER FOR YOU TO HIRE SOMEONE TO COME IN AND 
9 TEAR DOWN OR DESTROY THE BUILDING, HOW MUCH WOULD IT HAVE 
10 COST YOU? 
11 A. I THINK WE DID GET THREE BIDS IN DOING THAT, 
12 AND I THINK THEY RANGED LIKE 17, $1,800, REAL CLOSE IN 
13 THERE. 
14 Q. AND YOU TOLD MIC JENSEN THAT, IT WOULD COST YOU 
15 ABOUT $1,800 TO TEAR DOWN THAT BUILDING? 
16 A. I BELIEVE SO. 
17 Q. DID YOU TELL DEAN LARSEN ON THE MORNING THAT HE 
18 TALKED TO YOU, YOU DIDN'T THINK YOU HAD INSURANCE ON THAT 
19 BUSINESS? 
20 A. I WASN'T SURE WHAT THE STATUS WAS ON IT. WE 
21 HAD NEVER RECEIVED A COPY FROM OUR AGENT. 
22 Q. HADN'T YOU OBTAINED INSURANCE THAT SUMMER, 
23 SUMMER OF JULY OF 1986, JUST FOUR MONTHS EARLIER? 
24 A. ON THE OTHER BUILDING, WE HAD BOUGHT INSURANCE 
25 FOR THAT BUILDING. AND WHEN WE WERE TALKING TO THE AGENTS 
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1 WE WERE TELLING HIM WE COULDN'T GET FIRE INSURANCE ON THIS 
2 OTHER BUILDING AND HE SAID: SHOOT, I'LL WRITE THAT UP. SO 
3 WE WALKED NEXT DOOR AND HE WROTE IT UP, AND I BELIEVE WE 
4 SIGNED -- I EVEN THINK THAT WE PAID, BUT WE HAD NEVER 
5 RECEIVED A COPY OF THE POLICY. AND THE OTHER CONCERN THAT 
6 I HAD, WHEN I TOLD MR. LARSEN I WASN'T SURE IF WE HAD 
7 INSURANCE, IS BECAUSE I BELIEVED AT THE TIME THAT THE 
8 INSURANCE WAS IN OUR CORPORATE NAME, A-1 SPRINKLERS INC., 
9 AND THAT THE BUILDING WAS IN MY PERSONAL NAME, WAYNE S. 
10 WARDLE. SO I WASN'T SURE WHAT THE STATUS WAS UNTIL I 
11 CALLED MY AGENT. 
12 Q. WASN'T THE QUESTION THAT WAS POSED TO YOU ON 
13 THE MORNING OF THE FIRE, WAS WHETHER OR NOT THE BUILDING 
14 WAS INSURED? 
15 A. THAT IS CORRECT, AND MY ANSWER TO THAT WAS I 
16 DON'T KNOW. 
17 Q. YET YOU AGREE THAT THAT SUMMER YOU HAD GONE AND 
18 TAKEN OUT AN INSURANCE POLICY FOR BOTH BUILDINGS? 
19 A. WHAT WE HAD DONE IS TAKEN OUT INSURANCE ON THE 
20 ONE BUILDING AND HE WROTE IT UP ON THE OTHER BUILDING. 
21 Q. ISN'T IT TRUE THE INSURANCE ON THE BUILDING 
22 THAT WAS DESTROYED, WAS $30,000? 
23 A. AS I RECALL, I BELIEVE THAT'S CORRECT. 
24 Q. AND BOTH BUILDINGS TOGETHER AND ALL OF THE 
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1 A. I'M NOT SURE. 
2 Q. HAVE YOU EVER BOTHERED TO LOOK AT YOUR 
3 INSURANCE POLICY? 
4 A . I NEVER RECEIVED MY INSURANCE POLICY UNTIL 
5 AFTER THE FIRE, SIR. 
6 Q. YOU AGREE YOU FILED A PROOF OF LOSS STATEMENT 
7 IN DECEMBER, A COUPLE MONTHS AFTER THE FIRE? 
8 A. YES, I BELIEVE THAT'S IN HERE. 
9 Q. AND YOUR PROOF OF LOSS WAS FOR OVER $24,000, 
10 WASN'T IT? 
11 A. THAT IS CORRECT. 
12 Q. AND IT'S YOUR TESTIMONY TO THE JURY THAT YOU 
13 DIDN'T KNOW ANYTHING AT ALL ABOUT WHAT WENT INTO THE PROOF 
14 OF LOSS? 
15 A. NO, I READ IT. I UNDERSTAND THE PROOF AND LOSS 
16 EXACTLY. 
17 Q. NOT ONLY DID YOU READ IT, MR. WARDLE, YOU 
18 SIGNED IT? 
19 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
20 Q. ACKNOWLEDGING THE CONTENTS OF THAT PROOF OF 
21 LOSS IS TRUE AND CORRECT? 
22 A. I BELIEVE THAT IT IS TRUE AND CORRECT. 
23 Q. I SEE YOU BELIEVE NOW, EVEN THOUGH SOMEONE ELSE 
24 PREPARED IT, THAT YOU LOST OVER $24,000 FROM THE FIRE? 
25 A. I BELIEVE THAT THE LOSS THAT THESE PEOPLE 
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1 PREPARED WAS TRUE AND ACCURATE. 
2 Q. WHY DID YOU SETTLE THEN WITH THE INSURANCE 
3 COMPANY FOR $15,000 IF YOU LOST MORE THAN 24,000? 
4 A. I WOULD HAVE SETTLED FOR FIVE OR 6,000, WHICH I 
5 REALLY TRULY FELT I HAD LOST. 
6 Q. SO YOU DON'T THINK YOUR CLAIM WAS OVER 
7 INFLATED? 
8 A. I BELIEVE NOW THAT WE PROBABLY LOST 60 TO 
9 $70,000. 
10 Q. ON THE CLAIM? 
11 A. BECAUSE OF THAT FIRE. 
12 Q. WHAT DID YOU LOSE AS A RESULT OF THE FIRE 
13 ITSELF? 
14 A. MOSTLY WE LOST OUR RECORDS, NEXT WE LOST OUR 
15 CONVENIENCE, AND THREE WE LOST A LOT OF CREDIBILITY WITH 
16 OUR CUSTOMERS BECAUSE IT WAS IN THE NEWSPAPER. WE HAD A 
17 LOT OF CUSTOMERS THAT THOUGHT WE WERE OUT OF BUSINESS. AND 
18 WE DID LOSE A LOT OF BUSINESS BECAUSE OF IT. 
19 Q. WELL, IF YOU FELT LIKE YOU ACTUALLY LOST MORE 
20 THAN $24,000, WHY WOULD YOU ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT ON THIS 
21 CASE FOR 15,000? 
22 A. BECAUSE, SIR, I WASN'T SURE WE HAD INSURANCE. 
23 AND I REALLY FELT THAT IF I HAD FIVE OR $6,000, I COULD 
24 HAVE REPLACED WHAT WE WERE GOING TO TAKE OUT OF THAT 
25 BUILDING AND PUT IT IN OUR NEW BUILDING. 
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1 Q. YOU AGREE YOU LOST NOTHING AS FAR AS EARNINGS? 
2 A. NO, I DON'T AGREE WITH THAT. 
3 Q. DID YOU EVER TELL ANYONE THAT? 
4 A. I DON'T THINK ANYBODY EVER ASKED ME. 
5 Q. DIDN'T YOU HEAR MR. JENSEN, MIC JENSEN TESTIFY 
6 THIS MORNING THAT HE TOLD YOU THERE WAS A CLAUSE IN YOUR 
7 INSURANCE POLICY THAT ALLOWED THE COVERAGE OF LOST EARNINGS 
8 AS A RESULT OF THE FIRE? 
9 A. I HEARD HIM SAY THAT. I ALSO HEARD HIM SAY MY 
10 RESPONSE WAS: I DON'T THINK THAT WAS A MAJOR FACTOR. THAT 
11 WAS ALSO THE DAY AFTER THE FIRE. 
12 Q. AND YOU NEVER WENT BACK AND CLAIMED ANY LOST 
13 EARNINGS? 
14 A. I DID NOT. 
15 Q. SO THE FIRE DID NOT DISRUPT YOUR BUSINESS, DID 
16 IT? 
17 A. NO, THAT IS NOT TRUE. THE FIRE DID DISRUPT OUR 
18 BUSINESS A GREAT DEAL. 
19 Q. IN TERMS OF LOST EARNINGS, YOU NEVER LOST 
20 ANYTHING? 
21 A. I FEEL I LOST BETWEEN 40 AND $60,000. 
22 Q. WOULD YOU MIND EXPLAINING TO THE JURY WHY YOU 
23 NEVER FILED ANY KIND OF CLAIM OR PROOF OF LOSS WITH THE 
24 INSURANCE COMPANY FOR THAT? 
336 
1 WRAPPED US AROUND THE COALS. I WAS HAPPY AND FELT LUCKY WE 
2 WERE ABLE TO GET ANYTHING OUT OF IT. 
3 Q. IS IT TRUE IT ONLY COST $13,000 TO PUT A NEW 
4 BUILDING ON THE SITE WHERE THE OLD ONE BURNED DOWN? 
5 A. THAT ISN'T TRUE. 
6 Q. DID YOU EVER TELL MIC JENSEN THAT? 
7 A. WHAT? 
8 Q. THAT IT ONLY COST $13,000 TO PUT UP A NEW 
9 BUILDING WHERE THE OLD ONE WENT DOWN? 
10 A. I THINK YOU MISUNDERSTOOD THE CONVERSATION. 
11 Q. I'M ASKING YOU, SIR, DID YOU EVER TELL HIM 
12 THAT? 
13 A. I DON'T BELIEVE SO. 
14 Q. HOW MUCH DID IT COST TO PUT UP A NEW BUILDING; 
15 HAVE YOU PUT UP A NEW BUILDING THERE? 
16 A. WE HAVE. 
17 Q. WHAT KIND OF BUSINESS IS IT? 
18 A. WE COMBINED MY WIFE'S BUSINESS AND MY BUSINESS 
19 AND FOUR OTHER BUSINESSES. 
20 Q. WHAT KIND OF BUSINESS IS IT? 
21 A. I DON'T UNDERSTAND THE QUESTION. 
22 Q. WHAT DO YOU DO THERE, SIR, WHAT ARE YOU DOING 
23 NOW AT THIS BUSINESS, THIS LOCATION? 
24 A. BASICALLY WE'RE DOING THE SAME THING WE'VE 
25 ALWAYS DONE. SHE'S DOING THE SAME THING SHE'S ALWAYS DONE, 
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1 PLUS WE HAVE A-l FIRE SPRINKLERS, EXTINGUISHERS AND 
2 DETECTIVE AGENCY. 
3 Q. SO YOU HAVE FOUR DIFFERENT BUSINESSES OPERATING 
4 AT THAT LOCATION? 
5 A. I BELIEVE SO. 
6 Q. HOW MUCH DID IT COST TO PUT UP THAT BUSINESS? 
7 A. I'M NOT SURE OF THE COST, BUT I THINK IT WAS 
8 PROBABLY IN EXCESS OF 130,000. 
9 Q. YOU TORE DOWN THE OTHER BUILDING? 
10 A. THAT'S RIGHT. 
11 Q. TORE DOWN EVERYTHING AFTER THE FIRE? 
12 A. WE TORE DOWN THAT BUILDING AFTER THE FIRE. 
13 Q. AND PUT UP A NEW BUILDING IN ITS PLACE? 
14 A. AND OPERATED OUT OF MY WIFE'S BUILDING IN THE 
15 MEANTIME. 
16 Q. DID YOU KEEP ANY FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS STORED 
17 INSIDE THAT BUSINESS? 
18 A. NONE THAT I'M AWARE OF. 
19 Q. NONE AT ALL? 
20 A. NONE I'M AWARE OF. 
21 Q. HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THE PRESENCE OF THE 
22 HYDROCARBONS IN YOUR OFFICE? 
23 A. TO BE HONEST WITH YOU, SIR I DON'T. 
24 Q. YOU DON'T? 
25 A. I DON'T EXPLAIN THEM. I DON'T KNOW HOW THEY 
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1 GOT THERE, I DON'T KNOW HOW THEY GOT THERE, I DON'T 
2 UNDERSTAND THEM. 
3 Q. YOU DIDN'T SMELL ANY KIND OF AN ODOR WHEN YOU 
4 WENT IN THAT MORNING? 
5 A. I DIDN'T. 
6 Q. YOU NEVER SAW ANY EVIDENCE OF SMOKE? 
n
 A. I DIDN'T. THERE WAS NO SMOKE THAT I SEEN. 
8 Q. YET YOU BELIEVE THE SOLDERING IRON HAD BEEN 
9 PLUGGED IN FOR A LENGTHY PERIOD OF TIME AND WAS ON THE 
10 FLOOR AT THE TIME YOU ENTERED THE BUSINESS? 
11 A. I BELIEVE IT WAS. 
12 Q. WHAT WAS IT DOING? 
13 A. 1 DON'T UNDERSTAND. 
14 Q. WHAT WAS THE SOLDERING IRON DOING THAT MORNING 
15 WHEN YOU WENT IN? 
16 A. I DIDN'T SEE THE SOLDERING IRON, I DON'T KNOW. 
17 Q. I KNOW, BUT DO YOU KNOW WHERE IT WAS? 
18 A. I DIDN'T. 
19 Q. YOU KNEW THAT IT WAS PLUGGED IN? 
20 A. I DIDN'T. 
21 Q. AND IT WAS IN YOUR OFFICE? 
22 A. YES. 
23 (j DO YOU NORMAI I \ DO YOUR WORK INVOLVING THE 
24 SOLDERING IRON IN YOUR OFFICE? 
25 A. YES. 
339 
1 Q. DIDN'T YOU HAVE A TABLE SET UP IN THE OTHER 
2 WORK ROOMS? 
3 A. YES. 
4 Q. WHERE YOU NORMALLY DID YOUR WORK — ISN'T THAT 
5 WHERE YOU NORMALLY USED THE SOLDERING IRON? 
6 A. ABOUT 50 PERCENT OF THE TIME. 
7 Q. YOU'RE TELLING THE JURY 50 PERCENT OF THE TIME 
8 YOU SAT IN YOUR OFFICE AT YOUR DESK AND USED THE SOLDERING 
9 IRON? 
10 A. 90 PERCENT OF THE TIME I WAS AT MY OFFICE BY 
11 MYSELF, AND THE ONLY PHONE AT THE OFFICE WAS ON MY DESK AND 
12 SO I WOULD BRING MY WORK OUT AND ANSWER THE PHONE. I 
13 SIMPLY DO IT BY MY DESK. 
14 Q. WHERE DID YOU KEEP THE OTHER SOLDERING IRON? 
15 A. WHICH OTHER SOLDERING IRON? 
16 Q. DIDN'T YOU TESTIFY ON DIRECT EXAMINATION THAT 
17 YOU HAD ANOTHER ONE, THE ONE WITH THE TRIGGER? 
18 A. I BELIEVE THAT IT WAS ON MY DESK. 
19 Q. SO YOU'RE SAYING THAT BOTH SOLDERING IRONS WERE 
20 IN YOUR OFFICE? 
21 A. I'M SURE THERE'S PROBABLY HALF A DOZEN MORE. 
22 Q. HOW MANY SOLDERING IRONS DID YOU HAVE? 
23 A. I DON'T KNOW. 
24 Q. CAN YOU GIVE US SOME KIND OF AN IDEA? 
25 A. PROBABLY HALF A DOZEN. 
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9 Q. HOW DO YOU KNOW HOW MANY YOU HAD AT THE TIME OF 
10 THE FIRE THEN? 
11 A. I JUST KNOW I HAD A FEW SOLDERING IRONS. I'M 
12 SURE WE HAVE SOME IN OUR TRUCKS, SOME DOWNSTAIRS. 
13 Q. DO YOU KNOW HOW MUCH PROPERTY WAS DESTROYED IN 
14 THE FIRE? 
15 A. THE ONLY WAY THAT I KNOW ON THIS REPORT IS 
16 EVERYTHING THEY PUT ON THERE IS SOMETHING THEY FOUND 
17 SUBSTANTIALLY. 
18 Q. SOMEBODY ELSE FOUND? 
19 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
20 Q. HOW DO YOU KNOW THAT IF THE BUILDING IS 
21 DESTROYED Oh DAMAGED? 
22 A. I FELT THAT I WAS INVOLVED ENOUGH, IMPRESSED 
23 ENOUGH WITH THESE GUYS THAT THEY WERE VERY ACCURATE. 
24 Q. THEY JUST KIND OF WENT THROUGH THE STATEMENT 
25 AND SAID THAT LOOKS LIKE SOMETHING I RECOGNIZE, IT WAS 
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1 PROBABLY DESTROYED IN THE FIRE? 
2 A. I BELIEVE SO. 
3 Q. DID YOU DO ANY VERIFICATION TO TRY AND FIND OUT 
4 WHETHER ANY OF THE ITEMS LISTED ON THE PROOF OF LOSS WERE 
5 IN FACT DESTROYED IN THE FIRE? 
6 A. EVERYTHING IN THE BUILDING WAS DESTROYED IN THE 
7 FIRE. 
8 Q. I KNOW, BUT IS IT POSSIBLE SOME OF THE THINGS 
9 YOU LISTED ON THE PROOF OF LOSS MAY HAVE BEEN IN THE TRUCK 
10 OR THE OTHER BUILDING? 
11 A. NO, BECAUSE IN ORDER FOR THEM TO PUT IT ON THE 
12 LIST TO BEGIN IT, IT HAD TO BE THERE. BECAUSE WHAT WE DID 
13 IS WENT THROUGH EVERYTHING, PICKED IT UP; IF THEY DIDN'T 
14 KNOW WHAT IT WAS, THEY SAID WHAT IS THIS. SO I WAS VERY 
15 IMPRESSED WITH THEIR THOROUGHNESS. 
16 Q. DID YOU GO THROUGH WITH THEM STEP BY STEP AND 
17 SAY THESE WERE ITEMS HERE IN THE OFFICE AND THESE ITEMS 
18 WERE DESTROYED? 
19 A. NOT STEP BY STEP. 
20 Q. THEN HOW DO YOU KNOW WHAT WAS DESTROYED IN THE 
21 FIRE? 
22 A. EVERYTHING WAS IN THE BUILDING BECAUSE THEY 
23 WERE FIRE DAMAGED OR SMOKE DAMAGED. 
24 Q. HOW WERE YOU ABLE TO MAKE UP THIS LIST OF ITEMS 
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1 A. I DIDN'T MAKE IT UP. 
2 Q. I KNOW THAT. BUT HOW DO YOU KNOW WHETHER THE 
3 ITEMS THAT WERE LISTED WERE ACTUALLY IN THE FIRE? 
4 A. BECAUSE I FELT THAT THEY WERE ACCURATE. 
5 Q. SO IT'S JUST KIND OF A GUT REACTION ON YOUR 
6 PART? 
7 A. I GUESS IF THAT'S WHAT YOU CALL IT. 
8 Q. YOU TELL ME. YOU'RE THE ONE THAT SIGNED THE 
9 PROOF OF LOSS. WHERE DID YOU COME UP WITH THE CONCLUSION 
10 WHAT WAS DESTROYED IN THE FIRE? 
11 A. I BELIEVE THEIR INFORMATION WAS ACCURATE. 
12 Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY JUDGMENTS AGAINST YOU? 
13 A. I DON'T BELIEVE --
14 MR. METOS: I'LL OBJECT. I DON'T SEE THE 
15 RELEVANCE OF THIS. 
16 MR. JONES: GOES TO FINANCIAL INTEREST, YOUR 
17 HONOR. 
18 THE COURT: OVERRULED. 
19 THE WITNESS: I'M NOT AWARE I DO. 
20 Q. (BY MR. JONES) DID YOU HAVE ONE INVOLVING 
21 WESTERN GENERAL DAIRIES? 
22 " T DO OR DID. 
23 jiu iuu HAVE A GARNISHMENT AGAINST YOUR 
24 ACCOUNTS? 
25 A. I DON'T KNOW. 
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1 Q. GARNISHMENT WHERE THEY COME AND SEIZE MONEY OUT 
2 OF YOUR BANK ACCOUNTS? 
3 A. I DON'T KNOW. 
4 Q. DID YOU HAVE A JUDGMENT INVOLVING A MAN NAMED 
5 GARY GAVIN? 
6 A. NO. 
7 Q. A LAWSUIT WITH HIM? 
8 A. NO. 
9 Q. DID YOU OWE HIM MONEY? 
10 A. I DON'T KNOW WHO GARY GAVIN IS. 
11 Q. DID YOU EVER HAVE ANY EMPLOYEES THAT SUED YOU 
12 DURING THAT TIME? 
13 A. I'M SURE WE HAVE. 
14 Q. DID YOU CHANGE THE NAME OF YOUR BUSINESS ABOUT 
15 THE TIME OF THE FIRE? 
16 A. WE STILL HAVE NOT COMPLETED THE NAME CHANGE. 
17 IT'S IN THE — THAT PROCESS WILL TAKE A FEW MORE YEARS. 
18 Q. DID YOU START TO CHANGE THE NAME ABOUT THE TIME 
19 OF THE FIRE? 
20 A. I THINK THE YEAR BEFORE. 
21 Q. WHY WERE YOU CHANGING THE NAME? 
22 A. WE WERE INCORPORATING. 
23 Q. WHY DID YOU CHANGE THE NAME? 
24 A. BECAUSE WE WERE INCORPORATING. 
25 Q. DID IT HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH LAWSUITS 
3 4 4 
1 PENDING AGAINST YOU? 
2 A . NOT AT ALL. 
1 Q. DID YOU CHANGE THE OWNER OF THE BUSINESS? 
4 A. I'M STILL THE PRIMARY OWNER. 
5 Q. DID YOU CHANGE THE OWNER AND PUT YOUR WIFE AS 
6 THE OWNER? 
7 A. SHE'S THE PRESIDENT OF THE CORPORATION. I'M A 
8 MAJOR STOCKHOLDER. 
0 y. SHE WASN'T BEFORE THE FIRE, WAS SHE? 
10 A. SHE STILL WAS. I'M STILL DBA. 
11 Q. DID YOU CHANGE YOUR CHECKING ACCOUNT ABOUT THE 
] 2 TIME OF THE FIRE? 
1 "J A. I CHANGED IT -- WHICH, ON THE BRIGHTON? 
14 y. DID YOU CHANGE IT TO VALLEY BANK? 
15 A. IT STILL IS. 
16 Q. AT THE TIME OF THE FIRE HOW MUCH MONEY DID YOU 
17 HAVE IN YOUR ACCOUNTS AT VALLEY BANK? 
18 A. I HAVE NO IDEA. 
19 Q. YOU DIDN'T HAVE ANYTHING, DID YOU? 
20 A. I HAVE TO HAVE SOMETHING, OTHERWISE THEY CLOSE 
21 IT. 
22 Q. HAD YOU TRANSFERRED ALL OF THE MONEY OUT OF THE 
23 VALLEY BANK ACCOUNT? 
24 A. I DON'T THINK WE TRANSFERRED ANY MONEY. 
2C> O. JUST USED EVERYTHING UP THAT WAS IN THAT 
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1 ACCOUNT? 
2 A. YEAH, THERE WAS NO POINT IN LEAVING MONEY IN 
3 THERE. 
4 Q. AND AGAIN THAT DIDN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH 
5 LAWSUITS OR ANY POSSIBLE LITIGATION? 
6 A. NO. 
7 Q. DID YOU TELL THE INVESTIGATORS THAT WERE THERE, 
8 MR. LARSEN AND BLUNDELL, THE TRUTH? 
9 A. I BELIEVE I DID. 
10 Q. DID YOU LIE TO THEM ABOUT ANYTHING AT ALL? 
11 A. I DON'T BELIEVE I LIED TO THEM ABOUT ANYTHING. 
12 Q. YOU SAY AT SOME POINT IN THE INVESTIGATION 
13 THOUGH, YOU KNEW THAT THEY THOUGHT IT WAS ARSON? 
14 A. MR. LARSEN ACCUSED AND OFFERED TO ARREST ME 
15 THAT DAY. 
16 Q. BUT HE DID NOT? 
17 A. NO, HE DID NOT. 
18 Q. YOU TOLD HIM HE NEEDED TO DO HIS HOMEWORK, 
19 DIDN'T YOU? 
20 A. THAT'S RIGHT. 
21 Q. AND HE DID, DIDN'T HE? 
22 A. NO, THEY DIDN'T. 
23 Q. DIDN'T HE SPEND THE NEXT COUPLE MONTHS 
24 INVESTIGATING THIS CASE? 
25 A. THEY MIGHT HAVE DONE. 
346 
1 Q. DIDN'T MR. ASHBY SPEND A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF 
2 TIME INVESTIGATING THIS CASE? 
3 A. HE DID. 
4 Q YOU DIDN'T LIKE MR. LARSEN'S CONCLUSIONS, DID 
b YOU? 
6 A. MR. LARSEN, I THOUGHT, WAS INCOMPETENT. 
7 Q. WHAT ABOUT MR. ASHBY? 
8 A. I BELIEVE MR. ASHBY IS AN HONEST MAN. 
9 Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH HIS CONCLUSION? 
10 A. I DON'T AGREE WITH HIS THEORY, BUT I AGREE WITH 
11 THE EVIDENCE HE'S PRESENTED. 
12 Q. YOU SA\ THAT THE CONTENTS OF THE SACK CONTAINED 
13 CUPS? 
14 A. I'M SURE IT DID, BUT I DON'T RECALL THE 
15 CONTENDS OF THE SACK. 
16 Q. ENVELOPES? 
17 A. I'M SURE IT DID. 
18 Q. LETTERS? 
19 A. POSSIBLY. 
20 Q. PAPER PRODUCTS, BASICALLY? 
21 A. DEFINITELY PAPER PRODUCTS. 
22 Q. WAS l'l YOUR OPINION, MR. WARDLE, AFTER HEARING 
23 THE EVIDENCE THAT SOMEHOW THE SOLDERING IRON STARTED THAT 
24 PAPER SACK ON hIRE? 
""" • «" -r no^xTr IJUITM T urjon snniiT THP <5<">T.nFRTNG 
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1 IRON, I REALLY DO BELIEVE THAT'S WHAT TRIGGERED THE FIRE. 
2 Q. EVEN IN LIGHT OF WHAT MR. ASHBY TESTIFIED HERE 
3 TODAY? 
4 A. THERE IS NO OTHER LOGICAL EXPLANATION. 
5 Q. SO IT'S YOUR CONTENTION THAT SOMEHOW THE 
6 SOLDERING IRON HAD STARTED THE PAPER SACK ON FIRE AND THAT 
7 IN TURN CAUSED THE WHOLE BUSINESS TO START ON FIRE? 
fl A. I DON'T SEE ANY OTHER OPTION. 
9 Q. WHAT TYPE OF CARPET DID YOU HAVE IN YOUR 
10 OFFICE? 
11 A. JUST AN OLD CARPET. 
12 Q. WELL, WAS IT LIKE THE ONE MR. ASHBY USED, THIS 
13 SAMPLE? 
14 A. ACTUALLY KIND OF A COMBINATION, HALFWAY BETWEEN 
15 BOTH OF THEM AS I CAN RECALL. 
16 Q. SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE BLUE ONE AND THE BROWN 
17 ONE? 
18 A. SOMEWHERE BETWEEN, I BELIEVE. IT WAS A REAL 
19 SHORT SHAG CARPET. 
20 Q. SO WHEN YOU SAY "IN BETWEEN", YOU'RE TALKING 
21 ABOUT A SHORTER NAP? 
22 A. YES. 
23 Q. WHAT'S THE FLOOR MADE OUT OF? 
24 A. THE FLOOR WHERE THE FIRE WAS INVOLVED WAS PRESS 
25 BOARD. 
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1 Q. JUST KIND OF — WOULD YOU DESCRIBE IT AS PRESS 
2 WOOD? 
3 A. WHAT .T IS, IS WOOD THAT THEY TAKE ALL THE 
4 CHIPS AND PUT A GLUE IN IT AND SMASH IT TOGETHER, AND IT'S 
5 CHEAPER THAN PLYWOOD. 
6 Q. THE PHONEBOOK WE'VE BEEN TALKING ABOUT, IS IT 
7 SIMILAR TO THE ONE MR. ASHBY HAS HERE? 
8 A. I DON'T RECALL. 
9 Q. YOU'VE HAD A CHANCE TO SEE EXHIBIT 18, HAVEN'T 
10 *Ol? 
11 A. I LOOKED AT IT, BUT TO BE HONEST I DIDN'T 
12 FXAMINE IT. I DIDN'T THINK I WAS SUPPOSED TO. 
13 g. WHAT TYPE OF PHONEBOOK IS THAT? 
14 A. I COULDN'T SAY, SIR. 
1" Q. WOULD YOU COME DOWN, TAKE A LOOK AT IT AND TELL 
16 ME? 
17 A. IT IS A MESSAGE BOOK. 
18 Q. WHERE DID YOU KEEP THE MESSAGE BOOK? 
19 A. ON THE FLOOR. 
20 Q. DO YOU RECALL WHEN THE LAST TIME WAS YOU SAW 
21 IT? 
22 A. WE PROBABLY HAD 50 MESSAGE BOOKS THVI WERE USED 
23 THAT WE KEPT H >R RH'ORDS. 
24 Q. WHAT ABOUT THIS PLASTIC, WHAT IS IT? 
25 A. 11 l.ODK1, I IH PUf BASE OF A LAMP THAT WAS 
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1 SITTING ON MY DESK. 
2 Q. SO THE LAST TIME YOU SAW IT IT WAS WHERE? 
3 A. SITTING ON MY DESK. 
4 Q. AND WHERE WAS THE SOLDERING IRON LAST TIME YOU 
5 SAW IT? 
6 A. LAST TIME I REMEMBER, IT WAS ALSO ON MY DESK. 
7 Q. IS THIS SOLDERING IRON THAT MR. ASHBY USED 
8 SIMILAR TO THE ONE YOU HAD? 
9 A. IT LOOKS VERY SIMILAR. 
10 Q. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE IS THE WATTS IN THIS ONE 
11 ARE A LITTLE STRONGER THAN THE ONE YOU HAD? 
12 A. APPARENTLY SO. 
13 Q. HOW MUCH EXPERIENCE HAVE YOU HAD USING THE 
14 SOLDERING IRON? 
15 A. TEN YEARS. 
16 Q. YOU USED IT HOW OFTEN? 
17 A. JUST DEPENDS UPON THE TYPE OF YEAR, THE SEASON; 
18 SOMETIMES THREE OR FOUR HOURS A DAY, SOMETIMES ONCE EVERY 
19 THREE MONTHS. 
20 Q. WHEN YOU'RE FINISHED USING IT, HOW DO YOU 
21 DISCONNECT IT? 
22 A. GENERALLY WHAT I WOULD DO IS RELEASE THE 
23 TRIGGER AND SET IT DOWN TO COOL. 
24 Q. BUT THIS ISN'T A TRIGGER MECHANISM? 
25 A. THAT IS CORRECT. 
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1 Q. HOW DO YOU DISCONNECT THIS ONE? 
2 A. THIS ONE YOU HAVE TO UNPLUG IT TO STOP THE 
3 CURRENT. 
4 Q. YOU DIDN'T DO THAT IN THIS CASE? 
5 A. NO, I DID NOT. 
6 Q. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THAT CONDUCT? 
7 A. WELL, BASICALLY I WENT TO FIND MY SOLDERING 
8 IRON, I DID NOT SEE IT. WHEN I WAS DOWNSTAIRS GETTING SOME 
9 OTHER STUFF I FOUND THAT SOLDERING IRON, SO I BROUGHT IT 
10 UP, PLUGGED IT IN, DONE MY SOLDERING. 
11 Q. WOULD YOU SAY YOU WERE NEGLIGENT THEN? 
12 A. WELL, IT CERTAINLY NOT VERY SMART, WAS IT. 
13 Q. CARELESS? 
14 A. I DON'T BELIEVE I WAS CARELESS. I BELIEVE I 
15 JUST WASN'T THINKING, I WASN'T USED TO USING THAT 
16 PARTICULAR IRON. 
17 Q. YOU DON'T HAVE ANY IDEA HOW IT GOT ON THE 
18 FLOOR? 
19 A. I DO NOT. 
20 MR. JONES: I BELIEVE THAT'S ALL I HAVE. 
21 THE COURT: MR. METOS? 
22 MR. METOS: JUST A COUPLE QUESTIONS. 
23 
24 REDIRECT-EXAMINATION 
25 BY MR. METOS: 
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1 Q. MR. JONES ASKED YOU ABOUT CHANGING YOUR COMPANY 
2 ACCOUNT FROM VALLEY BANK TO BRIGHTON BANK? 
3 A. YES. 
4 Q. THAT WAS IN FACT DONE? 
5 A. YES, IT WAS. 
6 Q. WHY DID YOU MOVE YOUR BUSINESS ACCOUNT TO 
7 BRIGHTON BANK? 
8 A. THEY REQUIRED US TO WHEN WE APPLIED FOR THE 
9 LOAN. 
10 Q. THEY WANTED YOUR BUSINESS ACCOUNT AT THEIR 
11 BANK; IS THAT CORRECT? 
12 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
13 Q. IT WASN'T TO AVOID ANY CREDITORS OR AVOID ANY 
14 JUDGMENTS OF ANY SORT? 
15 A. A BANK IS A BANK. THEY CAN GET YOU ANYPLACE 
16 THEY WANT TO. 
17 Q. MR. JONES ASKED YOU ABOUT A JUDGMENT. HAD THE 
18 JUDGMENTS THEY HAD AGAINST YOU BEEN SATISFIED? 
19 A. I HAVE NO JUDGMENTS AGAINST ME AT THIS TIME. 
20 Q. AT ONE TIME YOU HAD A JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU; IS 
21 THAT RIGHT? 
22 A. I'M SURE I DID. 
23 Q. HAD THAT BEEN SATISFIED PRIOR TO THIS FIRE? 
24 A. I DON'T RECALL. I DON'T KNOW WHICH JUDGMENTS 
25 WE'RE TALKING ABOUT. 
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1 Q. HE WAS NOT VERY CLEAR ABOUT THAT EITHER? 
2 A. NO, HE WAS NOT. 
3 Q. HE ASKED YOU ABOUT WHY YOU DIDN'T GO BACK AND 
4 CLAIM THESE LOST WAGES AND LOST BUSINESS. WHEN WAS IT YOU 
5 REALIZED THAT YOU HAD -- HOW MUCH YOU MAY HAVE LOST WITH 
6 RESPECT TO THE BUSINESS LOSSES? 
7 A. WELL, IT HIT US HARD IN THE SPRING OF '87. 
8 THAT'S WHEN WE MISSED MOST OF IT. 
9 Q. AND YOU RECEIVED THE SETTLEMENT IN FEBRUARY? 
10 A. I BELIEVE THAT'S RIGHT. 
11 Q. AT THE TIME THAT YOU WERE PAID THE S15,000 
12 SETTLEMENT, OF COURSE PART OF THAT WENT TO THE ADJUSTORS; 
13 IS THAT RIGHT? 
14 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
15 Q. THEY WORK ON A PERCENTAGE BASIS? 
16 A. THEY TAKE A THIRD. 
17 Q. WERE YOU REQUIRED TO SIGN A FORM CALLED A 
18 POLICY RELEASE AND INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT? 
19 A. I WAS. 
20 Q. WHAT DID YOU UNDERSTAND THAT TO MEAN? 
21 A. I UNDERSTOOD THAT MEANS I CAN'T COME BACK FOR 
22 ANY REASON UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
23 Q. SO AT HO i!Mf Y«>U REALIZED THEY HAD THESE 
24 ADDITIONAL LOSSES BECAUSE OF THE SIGNING OF THAT AGREEMENT, 
25 YOli lUlil.DN'T f M,I- H ik ANVMilHI INSURANCE COVERAGE? 
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1 A. THAT'S MY UNDERSTANDING. 
2 Q. AFTER THE BUILDING WAS BURNED DOWN, DID YOU 
3 HAVE TO PAY TO HAVE IT DEMOLISHED? 
4 A. WE DEMOLISHED IT OURSELVES. 
5 Q. WERE THERE ANY COSTS INVOLVED IN DOING THAT? 
6 A. ABOUT $450.00. 
7 Q. WERE YOU PLANNING TO DEMOLISH THE BUILDING 
8 YOURSELF AFTER YOU RECEIVED THESE OTHER BIDS? 
9 A. WELL, WE WEREN'T SURE THAT WE WERE GOING TO 
10 DEMOLISH THE BUILDING. WE HAD A THIRD ACRE DOWN THE 
11 STREET. AND WE ALSO AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAD PLANS, BIDS 
12 TO MOVE THAT HOUSE ONTO A NEW FOUNDATION. SO WE WEREN'T 
13 SURE WHAT WE WERE GOING TO DO, WE WERE JUST CHECKING 
14 ALTERNATIVES. 
15 Q. MR. JONES ASKED YOU HOW THAT SOLDERING IRON MAY 
16 HAVE ENDED UP ON THE FLOOR. AROUND THE FALL OF '86, DID 
17 YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEMS WITH ANIMALS IN THE BUILDING? 
18 ,. WE HAD SOME CA'iS THAT KEri 0)1 ZO:\i:r TN OUR 
19 BUILDING. 
20 Q. STRAY CATS? 
21 A. YEAH. 
22 Q. HOW, OTHER THAN FINDING THEM IN THERE, HOW 
23 WOULD YOU KNOW IF THEY HAD BEEN THERE? 
24 A. JUST THINGS MOVED AROUND OR URINE. 
25 Q. THINGS KNOCKED OVER? 
354 
1 A. YEAH. THEY WERE PRETTY GOOD SIZED CATS. 
2 MR. METOS: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
3 THE COURT: MR. JONES? 
4 
5 RE-CROSS EXAMINATION 
6 BY MR. JONES: 
7 Q. MR. WARDLE, I'M A LITTLE CONFUSED. ARE YOU 
8 TELLING THE JURY YOU DIDN'T KNOW YOU HAD A JUDGMENT? 
9 A. THE WAY YOU ASKED THE QUESTION, I DON'T KNOW 
10 WHAT YOU'RE ASKING. 
11 Q. I'M ASKING YOU, SIR, DID YOU EVER HAVE ANY 
12 JUDGMENTS AGAINST YOU IN A COURT OF LAW? 
13 A. I THINK I'VE HAD PROBABLY FIVE OR SIX JUDGMENTS 
14 AGAINST ME THROUGH MY HISTORY. 
15 Q. STARTING WHEN? 
16 A. I DON'T RECALL. 
17 Q. AND ENDING WHEN? 
18 A. I DON'T HAVE ANY CURRENT. 
19 Q. DID YOU HAVE ANY IN '86? 
20 A. I DON'T RECALL. I BELIEVE THAT I HAD A COUPLE. 
21 Q. I WHICH JUDGMENTS DO YOU RECALL HAVING? 
22 A. THF ONF THVI' YOU MfNTIONFD, WFSTKRN GENERAL 
23 DAIRIES FOR $762.00. HEY GOT - JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT AND WE 
DID PAY THAT • •• • "••-rTSFJED AT THAT TIME, 
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1 ABOUT IT. AND THERE WAS ONE FOR CONLEE COMPANY FOR FIVE OR 
2 $6,000, FOR A SUPPLY BILL WE HAD PAID, BUT CINDY DOWN THERE 
3 GOT A LITTLE OVERZEALOUS. AND FRANK DID APOLOGIZE, BUT I 
4 BELIEVE THAT'S STILL ON MY RECORD, BECAUSE WE SIMPLY 
5 HAVEN'T BOTHERED TO TAKE IT OFF. 
6 Q. SO AT THE TIME OF THE FIRE DID YOU HAVE THAT 
7 JUDGMENT PENDING? 
8 A. NO, IT WAS NEVER A JUDGMENT. IT WAS ALREADY 
9 PAID AND SATISFIED, BUT IT WAS NEVER ENTERED. 
10 Q. HOW MANY TIMES HAVE YOU BEEN SUED FOR CIVIL 
11 JUDGMENTS? 
12 MR. METOS: I'LL OBJECT. WE NEED TO BE MORE 
13 SPECIFIC. IF HE HAD CIVIL JUDGMENTS PENDING AND 
14 OUTSTANDING AT THE TIME, THAT MAY ESTABLISH A MOTIVE. BUT 
15 IF HE HAD CIVIL JUDGMENTS IN THE PAST AND SATISFIED THEM, 
16 SO WHAT? 
17 THE COURT: SUSTAINED. 
18 Q. (BY MR. JONES) DID YOU HAVE ANY CIVIL 
19 JUDGMENTS PENDING OR IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THIS FIRE? 
20 A. I DON'T RECALL. 
21 MR. JONES: THAT'S ALL. 
22 MR. METOS: I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER. 
2 3 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. YOU MAY STEP DOWN. DO 
24 YOU HAVE ANY OTHER WITNESSES, MR. METOS? 
25 MR. METOS: NO OTHER WITNESSES. I WOULD MOVE 
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1 THAT THE COURT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE CONTENTS (JF THIS 
2 FILE, SPECIFICALLY THAT THE INFORMATION WAS FILED IN THIS 
3 CASE ON DECEMBER 3RD, 1987. 
4 THE COURT: ANY REBUTTAL? 
5 MR. JONES: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
6 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. MEMBERS OF THE JURY, IT 
7 APPEARS AS IF THE PARTIES ARE THROUGH PRESENTING EVIDENCE 
8 TO YOU. WE'RE GOING TO LET YOU GO HOME A LITTLE BIT EARLY 
9 TODAY. WE HAVE SOME LEGAL MATTERS THAT NEED TO BE TAKEN 
10 CARE OF, WE'LL HAVE YOU COME BACK IN THE MORNING WHEN 
11 YOU'RE MORE FRESH AND BEGIN YOUR DELIBERATIONS. SO DURING 
12 THIS RECESS, AGAIN, I INSTRUCT YOU THAT YOU ARE NOT TO 
13 DISCUSS THIS CASE WITH ANYONE, INCLUDING EACH OTHER. VOL 
14 ARE NOT TO TALK TO THE ATTORNEYS, WITNESSES OR THE PARTIES 
15 ABOUT ANYTHING AT ALL. DO NOT ATTEMPT TO LEARN ANYTHING 
16 ABOUT THIS CASE OUTSIDE OF THE COURTROOM, AND DO NOT FORM 
17 OR EXPRESS ANY OPINIONS ABOUT THIS CASE UNTIL IT IS FINALLY 
18 SUBMITTED TO YOU FOR YOUR DELIBERATIONS. 
19 WE'LL BE IN RECESS UNTIL 9 A.M. TOMORROW 
20 MORNING. IF I COULD SEE COUNSEL IN CHAMBERS. 
21 MR. METOS: YOU MIGHT WANT TO CLARIFY THEY 
22 WON'T GET TO BEGIN THEIR DELIBERATIONS, THEY HAVE TO LISTEN 
23 TO ME AND MR. JONES FIRST. 
24 THE COURT: AS I INDICATED EARLIER, YOU'LL BE 
25 INSTRUCTED IN THE LAW AND CLOSING ARGUMENTS. WE'LL BE IN 
Id. at 17 n. 2. 
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Very truly yours, 
Ronald E. Griffin 
Attorney for Ivan J. Heslop 
REG/sn 
cc: Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. 
Stuart H. Schultz, Esq. 
